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The purpose of this thesis is to identify factors that lead to resignation ofjunior
Surface Warfare Officers (SWO) and to develop an hedonic model of junior SWO
turnover. The first source of data was a survey of active-duty, junior SWOs currently
serving aboard ships. The second source of data was a survey of 0-3 SWOs who are
currently drilling in the Naval Reserves. Results of the two surveys were compared to
identify differing levels of satisfaction with the active-duty Navy. The reservists also
compared their satisfaction between the active-duty Navy and their current civilian
employment. Civilian salary levels were obtained from the reservists and their spouses to
determine the pay differential between the Navy and civilian jobs for former junior SWOs.
A regression model found three factors to have significant power in explaining
civilian pay: years since leaving active duty, employment status, and comparative work
stress between civilian employment and the active-duty Navy. SWOs with full-time
employment who experienced the greatest reductions in pay also experienced the greatest
reduction in work stress. Junior SWOs experienced, on average, a 20 percent pay cut




A. FUTURE DEPARTMENT HEAD REQUIREMENTS 1
B. THE INCREASING COMPLEXITY OF SURFACE WARFARE 1
C. THE HIGH COST OF TURNOVER 2
D. THE EFFECT OF TURNOVER ON OFFICER QUALITY 2
E. THE EFFECT OF HIGH TURNOVER ON RECRUITING 3
F. THE EFFECT OF TURNOVER ON PRODUCTIVITY 4
G. TURNOVER AS A SYMPTOM 6
II. LITERATURE REVIEW OF CIVILIAN STUDIES OF TURNOVER 7
A. WHAT PROCESS DOES AN EMPLOYEE USE WHEN DECIDING
TO QUIT? 7
B. ARE ALL EMPLOYEES EQUALLY LIKELY TO QUIT? 9
C. WHAT IS THE ROLE OF JOB SATISFACTION IN EMPLOYEE
TURNOVER? 11
D DOES THE LEVEL OF JOB-RELATED STRESS AFFECT JOB
SATISFACTION? 13
E. DO DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS INFLUENCE THE PROBABILITY
OF QUITTING? 14
F. DOES THE LEVEL OF TRAINING AND EXPERTISE AFFECT
THE PROBABILITY OF QUITTING? 15
G. WHAT IS THE ROLE OF GENERAL ECONOMIC PROSPERITY
IN THE STAY-LEAVE DECISION OF EMPLOYEES? 16
H. IS THERE A CORRELATION BETWEEN EMPLOYEE
PERFORMANCE AND RISK OF TURNOVER? 17
I. WHEN DO EMPLOYEES DECIDE TO QUIT? 18
J. WILL EMPLOYEES BE WILLING TO ACCEPT LOWER PAY IN
EXCHANGE FOR MORE FAVORABLE JOB ATTRIBUTES? 20
K. ARE THERE ANY SITUATIONS IN THE CIVILIAN SECTOR
THAT RESEMBLE THE PROBLEM OF SURFACE WARFARE
OFFICER TURNOVER? 22
III. LITERATURE REVIEW OF MILITARY STUDIES ON RETENTION 25
A. SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER STUDIES IN THE 1 970S AND
1980S 25
B. NAVAL AVIATOR TURNOVER 27
C. RECENT RESIGNATION SURVEY RESULTS 28
D. SWO RETENTION POINT PAPER 29
E. OTHER RECENT RESEARCH ON SWO RETENTION 31
vn
IV. METHODOLOGY 33
A. PROBLEMS WITH SURVEYS OF CURRENT EMPLOYEES TO
INVESTIGATE TURNOVER 33
B. THE ADVANTAGES OF THE POST-DEPARTURE SURVEY IN
STUDYING TURNOVER 39
C. METHODOLOGY USED IN THIS THESIS 40
D. A NOTE ABOUT THE USE OF STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ON
THE RESPONSES TO SATISFACTION QUESTIONS 47
V. THE FLEET SURVEY RESULTS 49
A. SATISFEERS AND DISSATISFIERS 49
B. CAREER INTENTIONS 50
C. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NUCLEAR-TRAINED AND
CONVENTIONAL SURFACE WARFARE OFFICERS 54
D. THE NAVY'S INTERNAL LABOR MARKET FOR SWOS 56
E. A MODEL OF CAREER INTENTIONS FOR CONVENTIONAL
SURFACE WARFARE OFFICERS 59
F A MODEL OF CAREER INTENTIONS FOR NUCLEAR-TRAINED
SURFACE WARFARE OFFICERS 61
VI. TFIE RESERVIST SURVEY RESULTS 65
A. DESCRIPTION OF THE RESPONDENTS 65
B. SATISFACTION WITH ACTIVE DUTY IN THE NAVY 66
C. COMPARISON OF THE ACTIVE-DUTY NAVY WITH CIVILIAN
LIFE 67
D. POSTGRADUATE EDUCATION 70
E. COMPARISON OF NAVY AND CIVILIAN WORKING HOURS .71
F. COMPARISON OF ACTIVE-DUTY AND CIVILIAN PAY 72
G CHANGE IN SPOUSE' S INCOME AS A FUNCTION OF THE
CHANGE IN RESPONDENT'S INCOME 75
H. HOW DOES CIVILIAN PAY COMPARE TO WHAT NAVY PAY
WOULD FIAVE BEEN HAD THE RESPONDENT STAYED ON
ACTIVE DUTY? 76
I. COMPARISON OF ESTIMATED POTENTIAL CIVILIAN
HOUSEHOLD INCOME TO ACTIVE-DUTY NAVY
HOUSEHOLD INCOME 78
J HEDONIC MODEL OF CHANGE IN PAY AFTER LEAVING
ACTIVE DUTY 79
K. THE EFFECT OF ACTIVE-DUTY SERVICE ON CIVILIAN
SALARIES 82
L. MODEL OF YEARS OF COMMISSIONED SERVICE WHEN
RESPONDENT LEFT ACTIVE DUTY 82
vni
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 87
A. THE PRIMARY CAUSES OF JUNIOR SURFACE WARFARE
OFFICER TURNOVER 87
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 91
LIST OF REFERENCES 95
APPENDIX A. THE FLEET SURVEY 99
APPENDIX B. FLEET SURVEY SATISFACTION RESULTS 105
APPENDIX C. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF SATISFACTION 107
APPENDIX D. ACTIVE-DUTY NAVY SATISFACTION 109
APPENDIX E. COMPARISON OF ACTIVE-DUTY NAVY AND CIVILIAN
LIFE Ill
APPENDIX F. TALLIED RESULTS OF RESERVIST SURVEY 113
APPENDIX G. CALCULATION OF NAVY PAY 121




The author wants to thank Professors Crawford and Weitzman, my wife, Leslie,
and my daughter, Melanie, for their guidance and patience during the writing of this thesis.
The author also wants to thank Commander Kusumoto, USN, Commander Chavez,
USN, and Ensign Caro, USN for their assistance in obtaining critical information. The
most gratitude, however, must be reserved for the hundreds ofjunior Surface Warfare
Officers who took time out of their day to complete and return my surveys. They are the




A. FUTURE DEPARTMENT HEAD REQUIREMENTS
There are several reasons why the current retention rates ofjunior Surface Warfare
Officers pose a problem for the United States Navy. The primary reason retention is
considered to be too low at its current rate (36 percent retention past minimum service
requirement) is that there will be a shortfall in Surface Warfare Officers needed to fill
department head billets in Fiscal Years 2000 through 2002. The Navy is currently
accessing 800-900 officers when it only has 600 billets for these officers to fill at the
division officer level. Even so, retention is so low that there is expected to be a shortfall
in department heads in FY 2000-2002 unless retention improves by as much as 10
percentage points. This is extremely inefficient. To give an historical perspective of the
feasibility of a dramatically improved retention rate, the average retention for Year Groups
1982 to 1988 was 34 percent and the average retention rate for Year Groups 75-84 was
37.5 percent. (Loeffler, 1996) In short, the required retention level is higher than has been
attained in the Surface Warfare Officer community in over a generation.
B. THE INCREASING COMPLEXITY OF SURFACE WARFARE
Even if filling department head billets several years from now were not a problem,
there are other reasons why the current retention rate should give cause for concern.
Surface warfare is becoming increasingly complex. On today's digital battlefield, a higher
level of expertise is required of Surface Warfare Officers than ever before. With turnover
rates as high as they currently are, it is difficult to maintain the level of training and
experience necessary to cope with this increasingly complex environment. Programs by
the Navy to minimize the manning on its ships will accentuate the importance of high skill
and experience levels in the future. Since manpower expense constitutes approximately a
quarter of the Navy's budget, (Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year
1 997) in face of current budgetary constraints, it is imperative that the Navy be able to
accomplish its mission with fewer personnel. As the manning levels drop, the experience
level of each individual officer becomes increasingly critical.
C. THE HIGH COST OF TURNOVER
Low retention causes enormous costs in recruiting, educating, training, and
compensating replacements for those who leave. The marginal commissioning cost of the
average Surface Warfare Officer accession is $48,000. The average marginal training cost
per Surface Warfare Officer is $51,093. (Bowman, 1995) That is a total replacement cost
of nearly $100,000 per Surface Warfare Officer. The real cost is probably even higher than
that because it does not take into consideration the training time and cost and
simultaneous lost productivity of the officer when he or she is getting surface warfare
qualified on board ship. It is clear that higher retention translates into significant cost
savings.
D. THE EFFECT OF TURNOVER ON OFFICER QUALITY
Low retention may result in a lower quality officer corps. In most cases, the
officers who leave, do so voluntarily. The Navy plays little role in deciding which 36
percent stay and which 64 percent leave. There is no guarantee that the Navy will retain
the best performing 36 percent. A recent meta-analysis of 56 civilian studies investigating
the links between performance and employee turnover revealed that "...all analyses
indicated an inverse relationship between performance and voluntary turnover." The
relationship between performance and turnover is not constant. It may be dependent on
the relationship between performance and rewards: "...when rewards were contingent on
performance, the inverse relationship between performance and voluntary turnover was
larger (rho= -.27) than it was when rewards were not linked to individual performance
(rho= -.18)." (Williams and Livingstone, 1994) Given the fact that in all but the most
extreme cases, promotion and pay during the minimum service requirement are not based
on performance, the link between performance and turnover for junior Surface Warfare
Officers can be assumed to be weak. Research by Bowman has shown that in the case of
Naval Academy graduates, "...the average quality of academy stayers (i.e., those who
select to stay to be considered for promotion to 0-4) differ only slightly compared to
leavers (the vast majority who voluntarily self-select out of active duty)." (Bowman, 1995)
Interestingly, Bowman found this not to be the case for ROTC and OCS graduates. "The
average quality of the ROTC, and even more so OCS, graduate leavers is far below that of
stayers from these two sources." (Bowman, 1995) If voluntary retention were higher
across the board, or a retention incentive based on superior performance were given at the
end of the minimum service requirement, then Navy could influence which officers
remained and which ones did not. The result would be higher quality officers serving
beyond the minimum service requirement.
E. THE EFFECT OF HIGH TURNOVER ON RECRUITING
Another disadvantage of a low retention rate is poor recruiting. Low retention is
a symptom ofjob dissatisfaction among some Surface Warfare Officers. Those Surface
Warfare Officers who are dissatisfied with their jobs may communicate these feelings to
midshipmen who have not yet decided their service selection. After hearing negative
feedback from the fleet, midshipmen who have the vision to be a pilot, the academic
background to be a submariner, or the physical abilities to be a Marine might be more
likely to choose these communities instead of Surface Warfare. Midshipmen who have
none of the characteristics required to choose anything else are forced by default to
become Surface Warfare Officers. These officers may not be as motivated or as high
quality as those who choose Surface Warfare voluntarily. The negative climate created by
these dissatisfied officers may even lower the morale of those who are motivated and
successful. The resulting negative climate of the community may be communicated again
to midshipmen on summer cruises or by other means and the vicious cycle of poor
recruiting, low morale, and poor retention is continued.
F. THE EFFECT OF TURNOVER ON PRODUCTIVITY
Low retention is a problem due to its negative effect on productivity. Research
done by Brown and Leigh has demonstrated a clear link between psychological climate in
the workplace and performance by employees. Their research showed "...how an
environment that is perceived as psychologically safe and meaningful is related to greater
job involvement and commitment of time and energy in the work of the organization. In
turn, greater involvement and effort are positively related to superior performance." Their
study "...has shown that psychological climate and involvement influence people's
tendencies to work long and hard." (Brown and Leigh, 1996)
In the situation when retention to the minimum service requirement is enforced by
contract, it cannot be assumed that productivity is at its highest possible level for those
who would rather be working somewhere else. Since 64 percent of Surface Warfare
Officers leave when their commitment expires, it is more reasonable to assume that many
of these officers would leave earlier if they had the option. It is inconceivable that those
who are counting the days until their obligation expires are giving the Navy the full benefit
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of their initiative, training, and abilities. The incentive of future career advancement is
absent for these individuals.
Research on morale in military units confirms this. "Military units rated high on the
morale scales were also rated high on overall effectiveness and low on frequency of low-
morale activities like dissent, drug abuse, and destruction/sabotage. Members of units
rated high on some of the morale scales were more likely to report high morale and
intentions of reenlisting." (Motowidlo and Borman, 1977). Hunter, Schmidt, and Judiesch
determined that "...the top 1 percent of employees outperform average performers...by
127 percent in high-complexity jobs." (Williams and Livingstone, 1994). If there is even a
small directional relationship involving poor performance, job satisfaction, and the
intention to resign, the cost to the Navy is enormous.
In a study determining the financial cost of low job satisfaction among bank tellers,
the results showed a direct-cost savings of over 100 dollars (1977 dollars) per employee
per year for a .5 standard deviation improvement in job satisfaction. (Mirvis and Lawler,
1977). If conditions existed that resulted in higher voluntary retention, it would also result
in a higher percentage ofjunior officers who were truly putting forth their best effort. The
Navy would benefit from the higher productivity of each additional career-minded officer
While it is not clear what the monetary savings would be in the case of Surface Warfare
Officers, it is safe to think that it would be positive and significant.
G. TURNOVER AS A SYMPTOM
The final reason that low retention is a problem is that it may be a symptom that
something is wrong within the organization. The fact that currently 64 percent ofjunior
Surface Warfare Officers stay in the Navy only long enough meet the minimum service
requirement is a strong indicator of deficiencies within the Surface Warfare community.
Even if future billet requirements could be met with the implementation of monetary
incentives, the current retention rate should be investigated to determine ways of
identifying and correcting the deficiencies in the organization. For any organization to
survive, it must continuously measure and improve itself. One important measure of an
organization's quality is the retention of its employees. An organization that cannot instill
commitment in its employees will have a difficult time instilling commitment in its
customers — in this case, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, the
United States Congress, and, ultimately, the American people.
C. LITERATURE REVIEW OF CIVILIAN STUDIES OF TURNOVER
The study of employee turnover and satisfaction is not new. In fact, more than
three thousand studies on job satisfaction have been conducted in the last 60 years.
(Quarstein, McAfee, and Glassman, 1992) There is more than just an academic interest in
this field of study. The long-term performance of any organization is tied to the
productivity, satisfaction, and retention of its members. Though most of the research has
been conducted in the civilian environment, the findings may be applicable to the Surface
Warfare community of the United States Navy.
A. WHAT PROCESS DOES AN EMPLOYEE USE WHEN DECIDING TO
QUIT?
Several theories on the process of employee turnover have been developed over
the years. March and Simon (1958) focused on the links between job satisfaction and
employee turnover. (Lee, Mitchell, Wise, and Fireman, 1996) Traditional theory contends
that there are three stages to employee turnover:
First, job dissatisfaction initiates the process. Second, employees search
for alternatives prior to leaving their organizations. Third, people evaluate
these alternatives using a subjective expected utility decision (SEU) model.
(Leeetal., 1996)
In contrast, Lee and Mitchell's (1994) unfolding model states that there are four
different possible decision paths to turnover:
"Decision path one. A shock to the system is theorized to elicit a memory probe for the
recollection of a highly similar shock, situation, or response." For example, an employee
may have planned to quit his job if he were to win the lottery. If he actually wins the
lottery (a shock), it invokes the previously developed plan to quit his job. The shock may
be positive or negative. (Lee and Mitchell, 1994)
"Decision path two. A shock prompts an employee to reassess the quality of his or her
basic attachment to the organization." "For example, a woman is bypassed for promotion
(a shock). As a result, she may feel that her career has been seriously hindered (an image
violation); she may then decide that she can no longer work for the company and quits."
(Lee and Mitchell, 1994)
"Decision path three. A shock to the system signals an employee to assess whether a basic
attachment could form with another organization." "For example, a woman is transferred
to another location (a shock) and becomes unhappy (misfit between shock and images).
As a result, she begins to read employment advertisements and to signal colleagues that
she might want to leave. When alternatives are located, they are again judged with respect
to (her) images. If the surviving alternatives are judged acceptable but no better than the
current situation, the employee stays. If one alternative is judged acceptable and better
than the present situation, she leaves." (Lee and Mitchell, 1994)
"Decision path four. Here, no shock is involved. . . . Over time, some employees may
come to believe that they no longer fit in their jobs, because their values have become
compromised or their goals are not being reached." At this point, "... some people
experience so much job dissatisfaction that they simply quit, regardless of the presence or
absence of alternatives." Others follow the traditional turnover model of ". . . image
violation, some dissatisfaction, job search, evaluation of alternatives, and offers in
hand."(Lee and Mitchell, 1994)
Another model of turnover is the expectancy model. "Basic to expectancy theory
is the idea that employees enter work organizations with expectations and values, and, if
these expectations are met, the employees will likely remain members of the organization."
(Kim, Price, Mueller, Watson, 1996)
The model developed by Price and Mueller also specifies the process
whereby met expectations and values, interacting with structural and
environmental variables, are translated into staying in or leaving the work
organization. Three variables - job satisfaction, organizational
commitment, and search behavior - describe this process. (Kim, Price,
Mueller, Watson, 1996)
B. ARE ALL EMPLOYEES EQUALLY LIKELY TO QUIT?
Jones and Sasser (1995) break down customers into four types based on the
source of their loyalty to the organization. While the research focuses on the customers'
relationship to an organization, the findings can be applied to the employee's relationship
to an organization as well. The first type of customer is called "the loyalist or the
apostle." The loyalist is defined as someone who is completely satisfied with a product or
service and can be counted on for repeat sales. Apostles are loyalists who are so
satisfied, whose experience so far exceeds their expectations, that they share their strong,
positive feelings with others. Apostles are your best salesmen. How does an organization
develop loyalists within its ranks? It is not enough to treat loyalists well when everything
is going right. The key is to treat them just as well, or better, when everything is going
wrong. Even highly satisfied loyalists can become a defector if that individual experiences
a single or string of product or customer service failures. The bottom line is that unless a
customer is completely satisfied with a product or service, then that person is a possible
defector. (Jones and Sasser, 1995)
The second type of customer is called "the defector or the terrorist." A defector
is anyone who leaves the company for another one. A defector can be any customer that
is not completely satisfied. The worst defectors are called "terrorists." These individuals
are so dissatisfied with their experience that they look forward to telling everyone they
know about their anger and frustration. (Jones and Sasser, 1995)
The third type of customer is "the mercenary." The mercenary has no loyalty to the
company whatsoever. They are attracted and retained by price alone and are always on
the lookout for a better deal. What is worse, they are fickle and expensive to attract and
retain. (Jones and Sasser, 1995)
The fourth type of customer is "the hostage." Hostages are those who have no
other choice but to remain with a company. No matter how badly the company treats this
group, the members have no other choice but to take it. While many companies feel little
urgency in correcting the problems faced by their "hostages," there are two reasons why
that is a dangerous attitude. First, if the company suddenly faces competition, the
hostages will be the first to leave. Not only is it expensive to replace these individuals, but
many may seek revenge. Many will become "terrorists." Second, even if the company
retains hostages, they may attempt to make it as difficult and expensive as possible for the
company. They will destroy the morale of those individuals who remain by choice. (Jones
and Sasser, 1995)
In the context of Jones and Sasser' s customer loyalty model, how should junior
Surface Warfare Officers serving their minimum service requirement be categorized?
Those officers who are serving only to meet their minimum service requirement are
10
"hostages." Those officers that would stay on active duty without an obligation to serve
are the loyalists. When the service obligation expires, we can determine to which group
an officer belongs by his or her actions. Those who remain after the obligation expires are
the "loyalists" and "apostles." Those who depart were the "hostages" and have now
become "defectors" or even "terrorists." In the surface nuclear community, those who
remain solely due to the retention bonus are the "mercenaries."
C. WHAT IS THE ROLE OF JOB SATISFACTION IN EMPLOYEE
TURNOVER?
It seems that the evidence of a link between job satisfaction and turnover is
overwhelming. "Carland, Spector (1987), in a meta-analysis of 47 studies, estimated a
corrected correlation between job satisfaction and turnover of -.26 (the 95 percent
confidence interval did not include zero)." (Judge, 1993) However, the strength of that
link is not consistent from organization to organization or from individual to individual.
While research has shown that the employee's level ofjob satisfaction affects commitment
to the organization, there is also evidence to support that the reverse is also true. That is,
the commitment to the organization may affect the employee's level ofjob satisfaction.
"...Identical events can hold different meaning to individuals depending on their frame of
reference toward the organization (cf, Smith, Kendall, & Hulin, 1969). Although the
same environmental stimuli may be perceived by newcomers, their interpretations may
vary systematically with their commitment propensity. Individuals with higher commitment
propensity may interpret the same events more favorably than with lower commitment
propensity." (Lee, et al., 1996)
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The fact that graduates of the Naval Academy have higher retention rates than
those from Officer Candidate School (OCS) or Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps
(NROTC) (Bowman, 1995) may be in part due to their higher commitment to the Navy.
Whether that commitment was established prior to attending the Naval Academy and/or
was solidified while at the Academy, its effect may be to cause Academy graduates to
react more favorably than graduates of other commissioning sources to the same
circumstances.
In 1952, Weitz "... speculated that if two workers report the same level ofjob
satisfaction, the one most [sic] likely to quit is the one with the highest [sic]
predisposition to be happy or satisfied in general." The research conducted by Judge
concluded that "... individuals dissatisfied with their jobs but positively disposed to life in
general were the individuals most likely to quit." (Judge, 1993)
If predisposition is a factor in unrestricted line officer retention then the
implications are ominous. It implies that a sorting process takes place at the end of the
minimum service requirement in which the survivors are increasingly made up of those
who are more negatively disposed to life in general. While other organizations may be
able to laterally input positively disposed individuals at nearly any level of the
organization, unrestricted line communities in the Navy for the most part do not. One
complaint that many junior Surface Warfare Officers have is with the quality of their i
immediate superior. While that is not an unusual complaint in any work setting. Judge's
research into the connection between disposition and turnover may give some insight into
the mechanism that creates such an environment.
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Judge's work also helps explain why most satisfaction surveys do not explain more
of the decision of employees to stay or leave. One significant excluded variable in these
analyses of satisfaction may be the disposition of the respondent. The general disposition
of the respondent may be dissected into more specific categories including what are
sometimes referred to as "taste for military life." The implication is that different people
subjected to identical conditions can react very differently depending on their individual
tastes or sensitivities to that environment. Those who are less sensitive to negative work
factors may be more likely to remain. Those who are more sensitive may be more likely to
quit. If sorting based on sensitivity to negative work factors is taking place in the Surface
Warfare community, then that has implications for the characteristics of those who stay
beyond the minimum service requirement. Those who stay beyond their minimum service
requirement will be less sensitive to negative work factors, on average, than those who
have not yet completed their minimum service requirement. Again, the lateral influx of
employees at all levels would reduce the effect of this sorting process in other
organizations, but does not occur in the unrestricted line communities of the United States
Navy.
D. DOES THE LEVEL OF JOB-RELATED STRESS AFFECT JOB
SATISFACTION?
e
'Job stress has four dimensions: resource inadequacy, role ambiguity, role conflict,
and workload." (Kim, Price, Mueller, and Watson, 1996) In the current environment of
shrinking resources and constantly changing missions, the Navy appears to have all of the
conditions necessary for high stress. Some studies have confirmed the connection between
13
stress and job satisfaction. "For the sales profession, two broad influences that have
consistently been shown to influence satisfaction are the stress associated with a
salesperson's job and the impact of leadership behavior (Behrman and Perrault 1984; Teas
1983)" (Jones, Kantak, Futrell, and Johnston, 1996)
"However, a considerable amount of literature (Beehr, 1976; Kaufman, 1989;
Karasek & Theorell, 1990) suggests that high amounts of autonomy and social support
may buffer the impact ofjob stress on job satisfaction and organizational commitment.
For instance, individuals who experience considerable stress may not be dissatisfied and be
relatively committed if they can influence their jobs or they receive strong assistance from
others." (Kim, et al., 1996). In fact, a study of turnover among Air Force physicians
found that "... job-stress variables are not found to be highly important, either in their
impact on intent to stay or on satisfaction and commitment." (Kim, et al., 1996)
E. DO DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS INFLUENCE THE PROBABILITY OF
QUITTING?
Age seems to have the most significant demographic influence on turnover. A
study by Meyer, Beville, Magedanz, and Hackert (1979) showed that younger employees
of the State of South Dakota had significantly higher turnover rates than older employees.
"Possible explanations for the relationship between quit rates and youth include indecision
by younger employees regarding preferred career paths and region of residence, as well as
the possible absence of increased family responsibilities and/or financial obligations that
may constrain quit decisions." (Kellough and Osuna, 1995)
Depending on the situation, gender may or may not have an impact on turnover
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among employees. "For individual employees of the same age and of similar qualifications,
tenure, and job placement, gender appears to have little effect on the decision to quit (Blau
and Kahn, 1981; Lewis and Park, 1989; Lewis, 1991). Lewis and Park (1989), however,
did find that among young professionals and administrators, women were more likely to
quit than men." (Kellough and Osuna, 1995)
Race was found to have an inconsistent role in turnover:
...[W]hen certain personal and job characteristics were controlled, Bleu and
Kahn found that blacks actually quit significantly less than whites (Blau and
Kahn 1981). Some research suggests that racial/ethnic discrimination in
labor markets, which has the effect of making job searches more difficult
for minorities, also works to deter members of minority groups from
quitting (Holmlund and Lang, 1985; Zax, 1989)
(Kellough and Osuna, 1995)
However, "... when occupational and other characteristics are held constant, women and
minorities have no greater propensity to quit than other workers." (Kellough and Osuna,
1995)
F. DOES THE LEVEL OF TRAINING AND EXPERTISE AFFECT THE
PROBABILITY OF QUITTING?
"A review of the literature by Frice (1977) finds a substantial amount of evidence
to support the notion that occupational professionalism is positively associated with quit
behavior because individuals in such positions often have numerous alternative job
opportunities." (Kellough and Osuna, 1995) The implication in the Surface Warfare
community is twofold. It explains why nuclear-trained Surface Warfare Officers have
required an annual bonus to maintain retention at the required levels while, until recently,
other Surface Warfare Officers have not. As Surface Warfare Officers become more
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highly trained and are required to work with increasingly complex systems, it follows that
the number of acceptable job opportunities for them outside military service will continue
to grow. If all other factors are held constant, this trend alone would tend to predict
declining retention among junior Surface Warfare Officers.
G. WHAT IS THE ROLE OF GENERAL ECONOMIC PROSPERITY IN THE
STAY-LEAVE DECISION OF EMPLOYEES?
It seems clear that economic conditions play a role in the stay-leave decision. At
one extreme, some employees may be so dissatisfied with their work environment that
they will leave regardless of economic conditions or the probability of obtaining another
job. At the other extreme, some employees have so much loyalty or satisfaction with their
jobs, that they would be unwilling to leave regardless of the economic conditions. Most
employees fall in between the two extremes, always scanning at some level the alternatives
to their current employment. Carsten and Spector performed research that studied the link
between economic conditions and employee turnover. Their model predicted "... that
the relation between job satisfaction and turnover will be strong during periods of low
unemployment (economic prosperity) and weak during periods of high unemployment
(economic hardship). These results indicate that the job satisfaction-turnover relation
became weaker as the employment level (available alternatives) decreased." (Carsten and
Spector, 1987)
Among members of the military, external economic conditions may play less of a
role. Miller, Katerberg, and Hulin (1979) found that economic conditions played a
relatively small role in the turnover decisions of the National Guardsmen. ". . . [I]t seems
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more likely that labor market perceptions may influence resignation behavior only under
extreme, negative circumstances (e.g., economic recession), acting as a constraint on
negative affect being translated into turnover." (Miller, et al., 1979)
H. IS THERE A CORRELATION BETWEEN EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE
AND RISK OF TURNOVER?
While much research has been done on thefrequency of employee turnover, far
less research has been done on thefunctionality of employee turnover. Functionality
refers to the quality of the employees you retain compared to the quality of those you lose.
Some level of employee turnover is, in fact, desirable. However, this is only true if the
organization is ridding itself of its worst employees and retaining its best employees. That
is why the functionality of turnover is as important as the frequency of turnover to the
health of the organization. (Hollenbeck and Williams, 1986)
Harrison, Virick, and William (1996) conducted research on sales representatives
to find the determinants of the functionality of turnover. They confirmed that functionality
of turnover is significantly affected by the magnitude of the reward contingency for
performance. The larger the difference in reward for those who perform well from those
who do not, the greater the positive correlation between staying and performance. The
hypothesized mechanism is that in the high-reward situation, the job satisfaction of the
high performers is increased by receiving the reward. The increased satisfaction results in
higher retention for this group. The low performers have their job satisfaction lowered by
the knowledge that they did not receive a reward for their efforts. The lower satisfaction
causes lower retention for this group. In situations where there is no reward for high
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performance, the opposite might occur. Those who perform better have their job
satisfaction lowered by the knowledge that they will not receive any reward for their
efforts. Therefore, their retention is lowered. Those who perform poorly may have their
job satisfaction increased by the knowledge that they will not be punished for poor
performance. The result is that their retention is increased. (Harrison, Virick, and William,
1996)
These findings have ominous implications for the functionality of turnover among
junior Surface Warfare Officers. During the period of the minimum service requirement,
there is little difference in reward based on performance. Fitness reports have been
historically inflated, promotions and pay raises are automatic except in extreme cases, and
the awarding of medals to junior officers is perceived to be inconsistent and/or infrequent.
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In such an environment, it is natural to assume that the functionality of turnover is neutral
at best or dysfunctional at worst.
The fact that some communities receive retention bonuses while non-nuclear
Surface Warfare Officers do not, may have a similar effect on the entire Surface Warfare
community. In addition to the economic influence the bonuses have on the retention of
the communities that receive them, they may also have a retention-lowering effect on the
communities that do not. Surface Warfare Officers may have their satisfaction and
commitment to the Navy lowered by the fact that they are currently not eligible for a
bonus even though they may feel they work as hard as those who are eligible.
I. WHEN DO EMPLOYEES DECIDE TO QUIT?
In the situation in which employees enter a contract to work for a specific length
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'of time, there may be three different groups with respect to their stay/leave decision. The
first group decides prior to joining the organization that it will quit when the contract
expires. The military targets this group specifically with its advertising messages that
proclaim the military's value as a stepping stone to a civilian career or to a college
education. In a study of turnover in the National Guard in 1979, Mobley, Horner, and
Hollingsworth "... indicated that intentions to quit were often formed at the time of the
original enlistment act, before experience in the organization had accrued." (Mobley,
Horner, and Hollingsworth, 1979)
Members of the second group join the military with an open mind. When they
enter the service, they do not have any specific plans to stay or leave at the expiration of
their obligated service. They are constantly reevaluating their career decision and its
alternatives.
Members of the third group decided to be careerists from the beginning. This
group will remain in the service at least twenty years unless they experience an
accumulation of dissatisfaction with the service over a lengthy period of time, as described
by the Situational Occurrences theory. Mowdy, Porter and Steers (1982) conjectured that
"... newcomers who enter with a stronger desire for an organizational career and more
familiarity with the organization's core values should develop stronger subsequent
organizational commitment than those who enter with lower levels of such personal
characteristics." (Lee, et al. 1996)
Qaurstein, McAfee, and Glassman (1992) have developed the Situational
Occurrences Theory ofjob satisfaction. The theory holds that job satisfaction is
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determined by two factors: "situational characteristics" and "situational occurrences."
Situational characteristics are all of the work factors that can be evaluated prior to actually
accepting the job. Examples are pay, promotional opportunities, working conditions,
company policies, and supervision. "Situational occurrences" are factors that are often
discovered after starting work at a new job and may be positive or negative. Positive
examples might be giving a concrete reward for employees who perform a task
exceptionally well. "Negative examples include all of the seemingly little nuisances one
finds on the job, such as insufficient paper towels in the rest rooms, broken copying
equipment, forgetful supervisors, a rude remark by a co-worker, and confusing memos."
(Quarstein, et al., 1992)
The effect of these positive and negative situational occurrences may be
cumulative. "Repeated exposure to confusing memos, rude remarks made by others, loud
telephones, dirty file cabinets, errors made on one's paycheck, broken chairs, supply
shortages, etc., may ultimately become the straws that break the camel's back."
(Quarstein, et al., 1992)
J. WILL EMPLOYEES BE WILLING TO ACCEPT LOWER PAY IN
EXCHANGE FOR MORE FAVORABLE JOB ATTRIBUTES?
Sherwin Rosen popularized the theory of hedonic wages in 1974. According to
the hedonic wage theory, the "... variation in the observed mix of benefits and cash
compensation offered by employers competing for workers having the same productivity
is the result of the different tastes for benefits of those workers and the differential ability
of employers to provide those benefits." (Famulari and Manser, 1989)
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In 1996, McCue and Reed conducted research on the willingness of employees to
pay for improved job attributes. The study utilized the National Longitudinal Survey,
Youth Cohort, which surveyed 12,686 individuals about their willingness to accept
different jobs at different wage levels. The study concluded "... that non-wage
differences between jobs are very important to workers." The reservation wage is the
wage below which the worker would refuse the job in question. (Ehrenberg and Smith,
1994) The difference in the reservation wage for the least preferred job and the most
preferred job was $2.09 per hour. That is a significant difference for minimum-wage
workers. Since the jobs used in the survey were low-skill, entry-level jobs, very few had
any non-pecuniary fringe benefits to bias the results. The only differences between the jobs
were perceived attributes associated with the type of work. (McCue and Reed, 1996)
There are two factors that influence the demand for non-wage benefits. The first is
the presence of a differential tax rate. If tax rates become progressively higher as income
increases, then individuals will demand a higher ratio of non-wage benefits (that are not
taxed) to wages (that are taxed) as their incomes increase. The second is a result of the
view of non-wage benefits as being a "normal" good. A normal good is a good for
which the demand increases as income increases. Steven Woodbury estimated that a one-
percent increase in income leads to a greater-than-one-percent increase in the demand for
non-wage benefits. (Famulari and Manser, 1989)
Both factors may play a role in the turnover decisions ofjunior Surface Warfare
Officers. It is possible that as officers receive promotions and raises in pay, they may
expect the ratio of non-wage benefits to wages to increase. While the phrase "rank has its
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privileges," has a long history in the United States Navy, officers may not see any
increases in non-wage benefits during their minimum service requirement. The result is
an actual decline in the non-wage benefit to wage ratio and subsequent dissatisfaction with
service in the Navy.
Ifjunior Surface Warfare Officers are resigning their commissions in order to
obtain jobs with higher pay and more desirable job attributes, then that would clearly be
rational economic behavior. Certainly, as a minimum, a pay raise would be required to
improve retention if this is the case. Given the results of the McCue and Reed study,
however, it should not be surprising to find that some junior Surface Warfare Officers may
be resigning their commissions to obtain jobs at lower salaries in exchange for improved
non-pecuniary job attributes. For these officers, a pay raise may improve retention by
increasing the opportunity cost of the improved job attributes of their alternative
employment. However, if most junior Surface Warfare Officers are resigning for
improved job attributes at the expense of lower pay, then that suggests the possibility of
improving retention by improving Navy job attributes instead of raising Navy pay.
K. ARE THERE ANY SITUATIONS IN THE CIVILIAN SECTOR THAT
RESEMBLE THE PROBLEM OF SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER
TURNOVER?
A strikingly similar situation was uncovered in a study of truck driver turnover by
Richard, LeMay, and Taylor (1995). In 1992, the median turnover rate for all U.S.
companies was 8.4 percent. The average turnover for all U.S. trucking firms was 38
percent. (Richard et al, 1995) In addition to high turnover rates, another similarity
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between the trucking industry and the Surface Warfare community is that the job requires
unpredictable absences from home for long periods of time. Like Surface Warfare
community managers, managers of trucking firms are quick to attribute turnover to
insufficient pay or long separations from home. Richard et al. are skeptical that these two
reasons are the primary ones for high turnover rates:
While these variables certainly influence drivers' loyalty to the company or
to the profession, they are not necessarily the primary causes of driver
turnover. Attributing turnover to pay and time home does one very
important thing, however. It frees managers from having to make difficult
changes in the company. (Richard, et al., 1995)
Substantiating their claim, Richard et al. report that when two large trucking firms
increased their wages, turnover improved and then gradually returned to its previous level.
Instead of pay being the primary cause of turnover, other significant causes were found.
In decreasing order of importance, the authors noted the following to be the main causes
of truck driver turnover: the relationship with dispatchers, driver attitudes towards top
management, the realism ofjob previews, fairness in evaluations, accuracy of paychecks,
and attitudes about other trucking companies. If the situations are similar between the
trucking industry and the Surface Warfare community, then it is possible the causes of
turnover are similar as well.
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HI. LITERATURE REVIEW OF MILTARY STUDIES ON RETENTION
A. SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER STUDIES IN THE 1970S and 1980S
At least as far back as the 1960s, retention ofjunior Surface Warfare Officers has
been a recognized problem within the United States Navy. (Githens, 1979) Depending on
the focus of the research and the time period in which it was conducted, different causes
have been identified for poor retention ofjunior Surface Warfare Officers over the years.
In 1979, several studies were conducted by the Navy on this problem. They focused on
initial assignments, personal qualification standards, the spouses ofjunior officers, officer
quality, and the career decision process.
In 1979, Holzbach and Morrison found that "Although most JO's [Junior Officers]
receive satisfactory assignments, the assignment process itself, including interactions with
detailers and the timing of assignment notifications, has a negative impact on JO career
decisions." (Holzbach, Morrison, 1979) At the time, "The typical amount of prior
notification of new assignments ~ 2 months or less — is considered inadequate by JO's."
(Holzbach and Morrison, 1979)
In another 1979 Navy study, the focus was on the role of spouses in the career
decisions ofjunior Surface Warfare Officers. The study found that "Officers, in general,
felt their wives were supportive of their Navy careers. . . . Wives who worked outside the
home were less supportive of a Navy career than those who worked within the home.
Wives who were teachers or Navy officers found relocations were difficult to
accommodate and were more reluctant for their husbands to remain in the Navy than were
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wives in other types ofjobs." (Mohr, Holzbach, and Morrison, 1979) The same study also
found that "The least favorable aspect of a Navy career, according to the wives, was
separations. Pay, benefits, and location changes were viewed as equal, somewhat positive
factors. . . Wives who found the JO's superior officers helpful in adjusting to a new
location tended to be more supportive of a Navy career." (Mohr, et al., 1979)
In the Navy study by Cook and Morrison (1982), the focus of the research was on
the relationship between career intentions and the professional development of Junior
Surface Warfare Officers. The study concluded that "Controlling for time in service,
career intentions ofjunior SWOs [Surface Warfare Officers] were positively related to
SWO PQS [Personal Qualification System] progress. In addition, expeditious completion
of SWO PQS was positively related to junior SWO performance evaluations (fitness
reports)." (Cook and Morrison, 1982) The study also looked at the relationship between
billet, PQS progress, and career intentions. Junior SWOs who were assigned to
engineering billets for the majority of their initial sea tour completed their SWO
qualifications at a slower rate and had significantly lower career intentions than did SWOs
who were assigned to other departments. Interestingly, the fitness reports for SWOs
assigned to engineering were, on average, slightly higher than fitness reports for SWOs
who were assigned to other departments. (Cook and Morrison, 1982)
In 1983, the Navy studied the connection between first sea tour factors and the
retention ofjunior Surface Warfare Officers. The study found that ". . career intent was
found to be the single best predictor (of retention beyond the Minimum Service
Requirement), accounting for 25 percent of the variance in the criterion when used by
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itself." Specifically, "Career intent expressed by junior SWOs 1 to 2 years prior to MSR is
the best predictor available to forecast whether the officers will continue their career
beyond their first opportunity to resign." (Cook and Morrison, 1983) That officers often
do what they state they intend to do should not be surprising. While it might be useful for
planning and forecasting, it does little to explain why these officers are leaving. Cook and
Morrison also found that several other factors associated with an officer's first ship had a
significant impact on retention. "Officers receiving a split first assignment were more likely
to resign than those not receiving a split assignment." (Cook and Morrison) That is an
ominous result because the Navy recently instituted a policy that requires split tours for all
junior Surface Warfare Officers in order to increase their exposure to different platforms.
It is too soon to tell, but if history is a guide, the new spilt-tour policy may result in lower
junior Surface Warfare Officer retention.
How an officer perceives his or her first tour was found to a have a significant
impact on retention. "Junior SWO career decisions are influenced substantially by their
first sea tour experiences, perceptions of their work environment, and professional
development opportunities." (Cook and Morrison, 1982) Cook and Morrison did not
find, however, that continuance, career intent, or organizational commitment was related
to performance. This finding is consistent with an environment in which rewards are not
linked to performance.
B. NAVAL AVIATOR TURNOVER
In 1991, Bruce, Russel, and Morrison conducted research into the low retention
rates in the naval aviation community. Though aviators have very different career paths,
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service obligations, retention incentives, and civilian employment opportunities from
Surface Warfare Officers, this study is noteworthy because of its methodology. A survey
of former naval aviators was conducted after they had left active-duty. The results of the
survey were compared with the results of earlier surveys conducted on active-duty naval
aviators. The five leading reasons stated by the aviators for resigning were: the amount of
paperwork, crises management, detailers, work hours, and sea duty. The only opinion that
changed significantly from the active-duty to the civilian responses concerned the quality
of housing. Active-duty officers perceived housing in a civilian career to be much better
than housing while on active duty. However, those who actually had left the service and
obtained civilian housing perceived it to be more nearly comparable to housing while on
active duty. Notably, naval aviators who had resigned their commissions were, in
general, quite satisfied with their decisions and would do it all over again. (Bruce, et al.,
1991)
C. RECENT RESIGNATION SURVEY RESULTS
When Navy officers resign their commissions and leave active duty, they are
required to complete a survey that asks them to explain why they are resigning. Each
quarter, the results of this survey are tabulated and sent to the Assistant Chief ofNaval
Personnel for Military Personnel, Policy, and Career Progression (Pers -2). The Second
Quarter, Fiscal Year 1996 report listed the year-to-date top ten reasons for resignations
of Surface Warfare Officers. The following were the six most commonly given reasons in
decreasing order of importance: amount of family separation, promotion and advancement
opportunity, enjoyment from job, job fulfillment/challenge, amount of sea duty, and
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fairness in performance evaluations. (Nordmeyer, 1996)
D. SWO RETENTION POINT PAPER
CDR Pete Dougherty, the Surface Warfare community manager in BuPers (Pers-
21 lw) at the time, wrote a point paper on Surface Warfare Officer retention in 1994.
The concern about SWO retention was caused by projections that were showing a 400
Surface Warfare Officer shortfall for FY-95. It was also projected that Surface Warfare
would account for 50 percent of the entire Navy's officer shortfall for FY-95. He listed
the following factors as appearing to be responsible for the poor Surface Warfare Officer
retention rates:
1. "The Black Cloud Dilemma"
Navy-wide personnel cutbacks, an accelerated decommissioning schedule, and
reduced opportunity for command gave the perception that a future in the Surface
Warfare community was in doubt. "In addition, as evidenced in the enlisted communities,
junior officers may have propensity to resign their commissions because their wardroom
counterparts have, thus creating what (the Center for Navy Analysis) has dubbed the
'Lemming Effect.'"
2. "Family Separation: Doing More with Less"
The increased number of short-notice crises around the world has caused the Navy
to increase the pace of its operations at the same time resources are being cut. This
situation has increased the amount of family separation and increased the fatigue of crews
and ships.
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3. "Aggressive Inspection/Assist Visit schedule:"
The frequency of inspections and assist visits has put a strain on resources and
endurance of the crews even when in home port. "'Quality' family time (is) minimized or
non-existent. ... As evidenced by Navy's separation/PCS questionnaire, family separation
is the Number (one) reason/concern of today's officers, whether separating from the Navy
or not."
4. "OPPE (Operational Propulsion Plant Exam)"
This one inspection has become the pass/fail test for commanding officers. As a
result, the massive preparations for this inspection has diminished the Quality of Life for
entire crews of ships.
5. "Boys will be Boys"
The recent scandals that have embarrassed the Navy have had a dampening effect
on activities that built commaraderie and raised job enjoyment. "... .The requisite
O'Club 'get-togethers' of yesteryear, where steam was let off and fun had by all ('Work
hard, play hard') are now practically non-existent."
6. "Improved Job Market"
The current low unemployment rates have made the civilian job market favorable
for junior Surface Warfare Officers to leave the Navy and to find another job.
7. "The 'Baby Buster' Generation"
The current generation, known as "Baby Busters," places work at a lower priority
than the older "Baby Boomer" generation does. "Baby Busters" see work as only a means
to accomplish other things in their life - not as an end in itself. This philosophy may be
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incompatible with service in the United States Navy. (Dougherty, 1994)
E. OTHER RECENT RESEARCH ON SWO RETENTION
In 1996, Lt. Glenn Bautista wrote a thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School that
examined the connection between ship type and Surface Warfare Officer separation. He
concluded that the interrelationship among ship type, performance, and personal
characteristics was the most important factor in Surface Warfare Officer separation.
Specifically, initial assignment to an aircraft carrier and combat-logistics forces reduced
the probability of retention. On the other hand, initial assignment to a cruiser/destroyer
increased the probability of retention.
In 1996, Nakada, Mackin, and Mackie conducted a Navy study on nuclear officer
retention. Since some nuclear-qualified officers are Surface Warfare Officers, the results
of this study should be particularly pertinent to the study of Surface Warfare Officer
retention. The focus was on determining the pay elasticity of nuclear-trained officers for
retention bonuses. The results may give us insight into how increases in pay might effect
the retention of Surface Warfare Officers who are not nuclear-trained. The results of the
Nakada et al. study should be applied to conventional Surface Warfare Officers with
caution. There may be some systematic differences between nuclear-trained and non-
nuclear-trained Surface Warfare officers in their response to a retention bonus. Nuclear-
trained officers obtain more technical training than non-nuclear SWOs and must meet
strict undergraduate academic performance criteria that conventional SWOs do not have
to meet. For both reasons, nuclear-trained officers may have improved employment
opportunities in the civilian market and might be less likely to accept a retention bonus
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than conventional Surface Warfare Officers.
Economic conditions were not found to be an important factor in nuclear-officer
retention.
Unemployment effects were not particularly strong, and were not
statistically significant at the 0.05 level in most cases. Positive, significant
unemployment coefficients were observed only for the full sample. In these
equations, a 1 percent increase in the national unemployment rate results
in predicted .4 percent increase in retention. (Nakada et al., 1996)
Some Surface Warfare Officers who choose nuclear training may be doing so
merely for the increased pay given to those officers. Nuclear officers may systematically
consider pay a higher priority in their career decisions than those who do not choose
nuclear power. If this is the case, conventional Surface Warfare Officers may be less likely
to accept a retention bonus than nuclear-trained Surface Warfare Officers.
Nakada, et al. found a pay elasticity for nuclear-trained Surface Warfare officers
to be between .503 and .611. In other words, a ten per cent increase in regular military
compensation results in a 5.03 percent to a 6. 1 1 percent increase in retention. More
important than the elasticity itself is the finding that increases in pay do have a significant,
positive impact on the retention of nuclear-trained Surface Warfare Officers. As was
noted earlier in the literature review, increases in pay alone may improve retention
without improving commitment or loyalty to the organization As soon as an officer's




A. PROBLEMS WITH SURVEYS OF CURRENT EMPLOYEES TO
INVESTIGATE TURNOVER
Employee turnover has been studied in many ways over the last sixty years. Many
recent turnover studies are based on the findings ofMobley. Mobley proposed in 1977
that there is a link with several distinct steps between job dissatisfaction and the decision
to quit. Mobley's theory was that dissatisfaction leads to thoughts about quitting. These
thoughts lead to an evaluation of the utility of searching for alternative work, to actual
search behavior, to evaluation ofwork alternatives, to intention to quit, and finally to the
act of resignation. (Mobley, 1979) According to this theory, if improvements are made in
the identified areas of high dissatisfaction, then employee satisfaction and retention will
improve.
There is a weak link in the line of reasoning behind this method. The weak link is
the connection between employee satisfaction with work factors and turnover. While
many studies have shown that the employee job satisfaction is significant in explaining
turnover, they also show that very little of the turnover is explained. Many employees
who say they are satisfied with their job or customers who say they are satisfied with their
purchase leave the company for another one shortly thereafter. Between 60 and 80
percent of customers who switch brands said they were satisfied or very satisfied with
their brand just prior to switching. (Daniel and King, 1995)
There are a number of reasons for the fact that much of employee turnover is
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unexplained by job satisfaction. There are many significant excluded variables in most
models of employee turnover utilizing self-reported job satisfaction. As stated in the
literature review, the correlation between job satisfaction and turnover varies with
unemployment. Personal dispositional factors play a role in the correlation between job
satisfaction and turnover. Demographic factors play an inconsistent role in turnover
depending on the individual and the type ofjob. Commitment to the organization may also
affect the correlation between job satisfaction and turnover. In total, these typically
excluded variables may play a larger role in explaining employee turnover than job
satisfaction itself.
Another deficiency in many satisfaction/turnover models is that there is an
expectation that there is a linear relationship between job satisfaction and the probability
of retention. Research by Jones and Sasser (1995) of customer loyalty shows that the
relationship is not linear. Depending on the level of competition, they found that there is
an exponential or logarithmic relationship between loyalty and satisfaction. In most
competitive environments, loyalty can only be counted on by those who state that they
have the highest level of satisfaction listed on the satisfaction scale. Anyone with less than
complete satisfaction should be assumed to be conducting some level of search behavior
for alternatives.
A very clear example of the disparity between satisfaction, loyalty, and retention
can be found in the automobile manufacturer, Saturn Corporation. This example focuses
on the customer - company relationship instead of the employee - company relationship.
However, many of the same factors which affect one relationship, affect the other as well.
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Saturn has stunned the automobile market with its extremely high levels of owner
satisfaction. J.D. Powers research in 1994 found that 91.8 percent of Saturn owners
were "satisfied with their car." However, the same research showed that only 80.3
percent of Saturn customers said they were "loyal to the brand." Only 66.3 percent of
Saturn customers said they "intended to purchase another Saturn." Even so, only 33.4
percent of Saturn owners said they "will definitely buy the same make." (Sawyers, 1994)
When it came to actually buying another Saturn, only 24.6 percent did. (Polk, 1997)
The retention of customers is quite different for Cadillac. Eighty-seven percent of
Cadillac owners said they were "satisfied with their car." Eighty-four percent of Cadillac
owners said they were "loyal to the brand." Seventy-one percent of Cadillac owners said
they "intend to purchase the same make." Forty-two percent of Cadillac owners said they
"will definitely buy the same make." (Sawyers, 1994) Finally, 43.8 percent of Cadillac
owners actually purchased another Cadillac. (Polk, 1997)
What is the difference between Cadillac and Saturn? The difference is
demographics. Saturn has the second highest number of owners under the age of thirty of
any car make. A little over 18 percent of Saturn owners are under the age of thirty, which
is exceeded only by Hyundai with 22 percent. In comparison, none of Cadillac owners
surveyed were under the age of thirty. Saturn owners tend to be young, low income, and
single of married without children. After owning a Saturn for several years, these owners
have increased their incomes and number of dependents. Unfortunately, for these satisfied
Saturn owners, Saturn does not make a larger, more expensive car. Therefore, these
owners are forced to buy another make which does offer a larger, more expensive car to
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fit their new lifestyles. Cadillac owners, in comparison, have very little changing in their
lives. Cadillac owners are older, at the top of their earnings curves, and their children have
left home. Saturn could not discover the reason for their low customer retention by
surveying its existing customers. Because of their extremely high satisfaction, no
significant reasons for defection can be found. It was only when Saturn discovered that
they were losing customers to makers of larger, more expensive cars did they discover the
reason for the low retention rates. Saturn now has plans to make a larger, more expensive
car to meet the growing needs of its customers. (McGinn, 1996)
Could there be a parallel between the retention of customers by Saturn and
retention of employees in the military? The demographics of both cases are similar. Saturn
is seen as a starter car while the military is seen as a starter career. Both of these images
are reinforced by each of the organization's own marketing strategies. Saturn loses many
of its satisfied customers because these customers have outgrown the company's
products. Could the military be losing some of its otherwise satisfied employees because
those employees are outgrowing the military? Saturn found that surveying its current
owners could not uncover the source of its retention problems. Could satisfaction surveys
conducted by the military to uncover the source of its retention problems be equally as
futile or misleading?
There are other reasons why job satisfaction surveys have not explained much of
employee turnover. One reason is that they typically survey the wrong population. If
employee turnover is the problem you are studying, then the population to study is the one
that has left the organization, not the one that remains in the organization Surveying your
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current employees leads to several errors. The opinions of those who are going to stay
may be systematically different from those who will leave. Unfortunately, at the time of
the survey, it is not possible to know whether a respondent is a leaver or a stayer.
(Reicheld, 1996)
One solution to this problem is to wait a period of time and match the survey
responses with actual turnover data. There are two problems with this solution. The
waiting required to determine which employees stay and which remain means that the
answers will not be obtained quickly to a retention problem that needs to be solved now.
The second problem is that it assumes a correlation between satisfaction reported on a
survey and turnover that may occur much later. The respondents themselves may not
know whether they are leavers or stayers when they fill out the survey. Their future
stay/leave decision may be based on events that have not even transpired at the time of the
survey.
Some may argue that the opinions of all of their employees are valuable, so there
is no need to make the distinction between stayers and leavers. If the problem were
morale or employee satisfaction, that would be correct. However, when the problem is
turnover, only the opinions of those who have left are pertinent. Only those employees
who have left are the ones the organization wishes it had retained but did not.
Turnover is not a random event. There are systematic differences between those
who stay and those who quit. Combining the opinions of stayers and leavers dilutes the
only opinions critical for improving retention ~ those who have left. One reason leavers
are rarely surveyed is that they, by definition, rarely remain in contact with the
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organization they leave. Therefore, it is expensive or impossible for the organization to
locate the leavers to survey them. However, spending money to uncover incorrect reasons
for employee turnover may be less expensive than the long-run consequences.
In some cases, the organization conducts an exit survey to determine the reasons
for leaving. This method has the advantage of selecting only those who are leaving to
answer the survey. While it is an improvement over surveying the entire workforce, this
method is not without drawbacks either. One drawback is that the respondent may be
fearful to state the reasons for departure truthfully. For instance, when an officer in the
Navy writes his or her letter of resignation, it is done up to year of advance of actually
leaving and the letter must be passed up that officer's chain of command. The pressure to
understate or leave out key reasons for leaving may be enormous. The other drawback of
a separation survey, like all other surveys, is that the responses are based on intentions
and opinions. "Lefkowitz and Katz (1969), compared results in exit interviews with those
obtained several months later by follow-up questionnaires. The subjects were female
voluntary terminees from a garment factory. Considerable distortion was revealed in that
59 percent of the sample reported different reasons on the two sets of data." (Githens,
1979) While there may or may not be any reason to falsify the responses, even among
completely honest respondents, it is more reliable to base the study of turnover on the
actions of individuals instead of their opinions or intentions.
To illustrate the differences in the investigation techniques, let us apply these
concepts to the crash of an F-14 fighter. The analogy is that the F-14 that crashed is like
an employee who quit his or her job. As the investigating officer of this crash would you
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rather study all of the F-14's that are still flying or the one that is smouldering on the
ground? While mishap investigations often look at the other aircraft in the wing or
squadron that are still flying, if possible, the focus of the investigation is usually on the
plane that crashed. The investigation of the other aircraft may uncover problems that may
or may not have anything to do with the crash and may or may not cause crashes for those
aircraft in the future. Certainly those items should be corrected when discovered.
Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that any of the problems in the other planes caused
the crash in question or will cause any crashes in the future. Much effort may be expended
in addressing more trivial problems when a significantly more serious problem remains
hidden in the remains of the crashed aircraft.
B. THE ADVANTAGES OF THE POST-DEPARTURE SURVEY IN
STUDYING TURNOVER
Studying employees after they have quit their jobs has several advantages. The first
advantage is that the results are not diluted by those who are not leaving the organization.
The second advantage is that respondents can answer more truthfully since there is no
opportunity for reprisal. The third advantage is that these individuals have had the
opportunity to make choices in the selection of their next job. When someone selects a
new job, that selection is much more honest than a response to a survey because it
satisfies real desires with real actions. There is nothing hypothetical about accepting new
employment. The separated individual, a rational economic actor, is selecting the job that
best fits his or her desires.
By studying what that selection is, we have information that we could not obtain
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any other way. We have information based on action, not opinion, of what employees who
have left are looking for in a job. While no job perfectly matches an individual's desires,
the one each employee selects is the one that best fits. By discovering what the most
desirable feasible employment alternative is, there will be an objective benchmark with
which to compare to the Navy. By using the competition as the benchmark, the Navy can
make improvements that will be targeted precisely where needed to improve retention.
C. METHODOLOGY USED IN THIS THESIS
This thesis studies the turnover ofjunior Surface Warfare Officers using two
methods. The first method involves a survey of 0-1 to 0-3 Surface Warfare Officers
currently serving in billets in the fleet. This survey will be referred to as the "fleet survey."
The second method involves a survey of 0-3 Surface Warfare Officers drilling in the
Naval Reserves. This survey will be referred to as the "reservist survey."
1. Goals of the Fleet Survey
The fleet survey has three goals. The first goal is to uncover the factors with
which junior Surface Warfare Officers are dissatisfied. The second goal is to determine
career intentions and their correlation to factors of dissatisfaction. Ideally, a significant
regression model can be developed to explain career intentions based on satisfaction with
aspects ofNavy life. The third goal is to determine what the internal labor market
competition is within the Navy is for Surface Warfare Officers. The Surface Warfare
community competes not only with alternatives outside the Navy, but also with alternative
careers within the Navy. Identifying differences in other communities will also serve to
highlight causal factors in Surface Warfare Officer turnover.
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The reason active duty officers are being surveyed, in spite of the disadvantages
that have already been discussed, is that the results can be used for a comparison with the
results of the survey of the reservists. The fleet survey will serve as a benchmark for the
reservist survey. The satisfaction with the active-duty Navy of the active duty
respondents can be compared with the satisfaction with the active-duty Navy of the
reservists. It is hypothesized that SWOs drilling in the Naval Reserves have similar
attitudes towards the active duty Navy as SWOs who are on active duty. Differences in
satisfaction between the two groups may help identify areas of dissatisfaction that are
most closely correlated with turnover.
When Surface Warfare Officers obtain their warfare qualification, it is typically
prior to the completion of their minimum service requirement. Once this qualification has
been achieved, they are able to apply for a lateral transfer to another community within the
Navy. To many who are dissatisfied with Surface Warfare, lateral transfer is seen as an
alternative to leaving the Navy for a civilian career. There are over a dozen communities
within the Navy for which an officer may apply. From the Supply Corps to the Judge
Advocate General Corps, many of these communities more closely resemble civilian
careers than Surface Warfare. Each community has a different mix of positive and
negative work characteristics. By asking SWOs which Navy community they would like
to transfer to and why, insight can be obtained into what Surface Warfare Officers do not
like about Surface Warfare and why they may leave the Navy altogether. It is assumed
that the work factors they would desire in another Navy community would be similar to
the qualities that they would desire in civilian employment and are lacking in their current
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jobs.
2. How the Fleet Survey was Conducted
The survey ofjunior Surface Warfare Officers was conducted with the assistance
of the Monterey Bay Chapter of the Surface Navy Association between August and
December of 1996. A copy of the survey was addressed to the Commanding Officer of
every surface afloat command in the United States Navy. Upon receipt, it was up to the
command to make the appropriate number of copies, distribute, collect, and mail the
surveys back. Not every command responded, and not every officer of the participating
commands filled out a survey. Not every question on every returned survey was answered.
The responses were then entered into Minitab Version 1 1 on a personal computer for
statistical analysis. A few Chief Warrant Officers, Commanders, and Supply Officers
returned surveys, but these surveys were not entered in the data base.
The target population of the survey was 0-1 to 0-4 Surface Warfare Officers. In
addition to the officers serving in the fleet, O- 1 through 0-4 Surface Warfare Officers
who are students at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) were also surveyed. The
responses from the NPS students and 0-4s are not used in the analysis for this thesis.
The purpose of the analysis is to gain insight into the factors that affect retention ofjunior
Surface Warfare Officers. Officers with the rank of 0-4, by virtue of their presence, have
made an implicit career decision. Also, retention of 0-4 Surface Warfare Officers is not
currently a problem within the Navy. Officers who are students at the Naval Postgraduate
School incur at least a three-year commitment to serve after graduation. These officers,
by their presence at NPS or their rank of 0-4, are more career-minded than the rest of the
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Surface Warfare Officers in the Navy and would bias the results.
The study of Surface Warfare officer turnover was not the primary purpose of the
fleet survey. The fleet survey contains numerous questions that are not applicable to this
thesis. Though all of the data from the fleet survey is included in the data file, only the
questions that are applicable to this thesis were used in the analysis. This survey is shown
in Appendix A.
3. Goals of the Reservist Survey
The survey of reservists attempts to do very much the same thing as the survey of
the active-duty members but it is potentially much more valuable. When an officer resigns
his or her commission and selects another job, that new job selection is honest and
revealing of work-factor desires, even more so than simply responses in a survey. Not
only does the action have real consequences, but it also is within the set of feasible options
for that individual. If surveyed, most people would say that they would prefer more time
off or more pay. The feasibility of fulfilling such desires varies depending on the
individual. One can learn what the best feasible alternative to a career in the Navy is for
an individual by finding out what actual changes he or she makes in employment after
resignation.
There were several specific goals of the reservist survey. One goal was to
determine ifjunior Surface Warfare Officers get paid more or less after they leave active-
duty than they did in the Navy. The hypothesis is that former junior Surface Warfare
Officers initially get paid less than they did before they left active duty. Previous studies
have used pay information from the Census Bureau's Public Use Microdata Sample
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(PUMS) to estimate the salaries that officers make after they leave the military.
Unfortunately, those data apply only to veterans with a bachelor's degree and a given
number of years of active-duty service. It does not distinguish between officer and
enlisted. It does not distinguish among the services or the communities within the
services. (Nakada, 1996) As a result, data for Surface Warfare officers may be mixed with
the data from former Air Force Sergeants who happen to have bachelor's degrees,
amongst others.
Other questions are not even addressed by the Census Bureau data. Do the
respondents work more hours or fewer hours than they did in the Navy? Is their medical
care perceived to be better or worse than it was in the Navy? Is the level of stress at work
higher or lower than it was in the Navy? By determining the differences between the
perceptions of the Navy and perceptions of civilian employment that these officers actually
obtain, one can get a realistic assessment ofwhere the Navy is succeeding in taking care of
its people and where it is not.
Another goal of the reservist survey is to develop an hedonic model that quantifies
the amount of non-wage job characteristics junior Surface Warfare Officers are
exchanging for changes in pay. The hypothesis is that these officers are accepting lower
pay in civilian jobs (at least initially) in exchange for perceived improvements in non-wage
job characteristics. The inputs to the model will be self-reported wages and self-reported
comparisons of satisfaction between reservists' civilian jobs and their most recent active-
duty jobs in the Navy.
Only officers drilling in the reserves were selected for survey for two important
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reasons. The first reason is that in order to survey personnel who are no longer attached
in any way to the armed forces, permission must be obtained from as high up as the Office
of the Secretary of Defense. The permission process, even if it is successful, takes up to
eight months to complete. The complexity and length of time required for approval takes
such a survey beyond the scope of what can be accomplished in a thesis at the Naval
Postgraduate School.
The second reason reservists were selected is that they have volunteered to
maintain regular contact and service in the Navy. In the spectrum of organizational
commitment, at one extreme there are those who would never resign from active duty. At
the other extreme, there are those who desire to sever all contact with the Navy no matter
what the circumstances. Those who are on the fence but decide to leave active duty, are
the ones who would be most likely to continue to serve in the reserves. These fence
sitters are also the ones who are at the margins of any changes in retention rates. If
attitudes towards the active-duty Navy are similar between reservists and active-duty
SWOs, it will tend to confirm that reserivists are near the margins of SWO retention and
not at the extremes. Since the Navy cannot feasibly create an organization that inspires
full voluntary retention, it must focus its efforts on those individuals who are at the
margin. Those who resign and begin drilling in the reserves are hypothesized to be
precisely the type of individuals the Navy should target.
The promotion to 0-3 in the Navy is, in most cases, automatic at the completion
of the fourth year of service. The completion of the fourth or fifth year of service is also
the end of the minimum service requirement depending on commissioning source and
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nuclear training. Therefore, nearly all of the officers who leave active duty at the end of
their minimum service requirement do so as a newly promoted 0-3.
Some officers resign from active duty several years after the completion their
minimum service requirement. Since it takes approximately six years to obtain promotion
to the next higher grade of 0-4, these officers are also resigning as 0-3 's. The 0-3
criterion also allows us to follow those who resigned immediately after their minimum
service requirement up to six years ago but are still 0-3 s in the Naval Reserves. A
comparison can then be made between what their civilian earnings are and what they
would have been if the officers had remained on active duty for up to six more years.
Officers who resign as an 0-1 or an 0-2 do not do so under normal circumstances
of officer resignation and therefore are excluded from the reservist survey unless they
remained in the reserves long enough after resignation to obtain promotion to 0-3
.
Retention of 0-4s is not a problem in the Surface Warfare community, so those who
resign as 0-4's are excluded. Those who resigned as 0-3 s after the completion of their
minimum service requirement and have since been promoted to 0-4 in the reserves were
also excluded. These officers either recently resigned too many years after their minimum
service requirement or resigned soon after their minimum service requirement more than
six years ago. Either way, they were excluded because the circumstances of their
resignation may be different from those that are the focus of this thesis, recent resignation
of Surface Warfare Officers soon after the completion of their minimum service
requirement.
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4. How the Reservist Survey was Conducted
The survey of the reservists was conducted in the following manner. A list of
home addresses was obtained from BuPers of the 0-3 Surface Warfare Officers drilling in
the Naval Reserves. Unfortunately, of the nearly 650 officers in this category, BuPers
only had the home addresses for 115. Surveys were sent to all 115 addresses. Some of
these addresses did not exist or were out-of-date. A list of the 650 0-3 Surface Warfare
Officers drilling in the Naval Reserves and the addresses of their drilling units was
obtained from Naval Reserve Personnel Center. Three hundred and eighty-five of those
officers who had not already been sent a mailing at home were sent a survey via their
drilling unit. The survey questions and responses are in Appendices D,E, and F.
D. A NOTE ABOUT THE USE OF STATISTICAL ANALYIS ON THE
RESPONSES TO SATISFACTION QUESTIONS
In both the Fleet Survey and the Reservist Survey, there were questions that asked
the respondent to indicate his or her satisfaction regarding a specific factor. The options
used were "very satisfied," "somewhat satisfied," "neither satisfied or dissatisfied,"
"somewhat dissatisfied," and "very dissatisfied." In the reservist survey, respondents were
asked to compare civilian life with the active-duty Navy. The options used were "much
better in the Navy," "slightly better in the Navy," "about the same as in the Navy,"
"slightly better as a civilian," and "much better as a civilian."
For the statistical analysis of these questions, a numerical value between 1 and 5
was assigned in the order of each of the five possible responses, as identified above. The
assumption made was that the five possible responses were on an equal interval scale.
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That is, the intervals between pairs of consecutive responses were assumed to be equal
There is no evidence that the intervals were or were not equal. However, as with any
survey of satisfaction, in order to perform mathematical operations on the data an
assumption of an interval scale has to be made. The result of an incorrect interval-scale
assumption is, at worst, that the statistical significance of some relationships may be lost.
While, relationships that are not significant will become even less so.
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V. THE FLEET SURVEY RESULTS
In all, 495 responses were obtained from 0-1 through 0-3 Surface Warfare
Officers who are currently serving on active duty in the fleet. Of these officers, 54 are
nuclear-trained. There were 130 ensigns (0-1), 196 lieutenants junior grade (0-2), and
169 lieutenants (0-3).
A. SATISFIERS AND DISSATISFEERS
The first set of questions requested that respondents "Indicate your satisfaction
with the following aspects of the Navy:" The entire table of tallied responses is shown in
Appendix B. Three of the most interesting findings are discussed below.
The aspect with the highest average satisfaction was "Promotion Opportunity."
The aspect with the lowest average satisfaction was "Amount ofFamily Separation."
Interestingly, average satisfaction with "Total Pay" was the second highest, slightly lower
than satisfaction with "Promotion Opportunity."
"Family Separation" is recently one of the areas of most dissatisfaction among
Surface Warfare Officers in the Navy. (Nordmeyer, 1996) However, if there is no
significant difference in the satisfaction with family separation between those who stay and
those who resign, it may not be a significant factor in their career decisions.
At the other extreme is satisfaction with "Promotion Opportunity." Simply because
respondents were, on average, more satisfied with "Promotion Opportunity" than any
other category does not mean that it is not the issue that distinguishes the stayers from the
leavers. In conducting analysis for turnover, it is the factors that distinguish stayers from
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leavers the most clearly that are the most important to our understanding the causes of
turnover.
Recall from the literature review that, in general, unless an individual reports the
highest level of satisfaction with an organization, then that individual is likely to be
engaged in some level of search activity for alternative organizations. Applied to the
results shown in Table 1, that means that only 12 percent and 15 percent of the
respondents are so satisfied with pay and promotion opportunity that they are not even
considering alternative careers. Conversely, 30 percent of respondents are so dissatisfied
with the "Amount of Family Separation" that there is very little that would convince them
to remain on active duty any longer than is required. The literature review referred to
these individuals as "terrorists." Many of these officers may be so dissatisfied that they
may have a negative impact on the morale of their wardrooms.













Total Pay 495 12 54 14 16 5
Promotion
opportunity
495 15 48 21 11 4
Amt of family
separation
488 4 31 36 30
All percentages are rounded to the nearest whole percent.
B. CAREER INTENTIONS




[ ] Serve more than 20 years with my current designator.
[ ] Serve 20 years with my current designator, and then retire.
[ ] Lateral transfer to a different community.
[ ] Keep my current designator and resign before 20 years."
I have coined the following terms to identify the respondents based on how they
answered this question:
Careerists: intention to remain in Navy as a SWO for more than twenty years.
Stayers: intention to remain in Navy as a SWO for twenty years.
Transfers: intention to lateral transfer to a different community.
Resigners: intention to resign before twenty years
The percentages of each, for conventional and nuclear-trained SWOs is shown in Table 2.
Table 2. "What are your current career plans?"
n= % Careerist % Stayers % Transfers % Resigners
Conventional
SWO
432 21 17 18 44
Nuke SWO 53 17 21 62
All percentages are rounded to the nearest whole percent
It is interesting to note that none of the nuclear-trained SWOs indicated that they
plan to lateral transfer within the Navy. This could be due, in part, to the Navy policy that
does not allow nuclear-trained SWOs to lateral transfer until they have completed their
Principal Assistant tour. The Principal Assistant tour occurs after the officer has
completed Department Head School and the officer is either a senior 0-3 or a junior 0-4.
Conventional Surface Warfare Officers, in comparison, are allowed to apply for lateral
transfer as soon as they obtain their Surface Warfare Officer qualification. This usually
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occurs in the officer's first four years of commissioned service.
It also appears that the ban on lateral transfers for nuclear-trained officers does
little to increase the percentage of these officers who wish to stay in the Navy for at least
20 years. Of those nuclear-trained SWOs who said they planned to resign, 27 percent said
they ". .
.
would stay in if I could lateral transfer to the community ofmy choice."
A one-way analysis of variance was performed on the satisfaction questions with
responses to the career-intentions question as the independent variable. It must be noted
that when using an analysis of variance on a question with responses that may not be on an
interval scale, it is more likely that significant differneces may exist but not are not
detected. However, the reverse is not true: significant differences will not be detected
unless they actually exist.
The goal was to see if there were statistically different responses to each
satisfaction question depending on the respondent's career intention. Only the satisfaction
questions with statistically significant differences (p< 05) in the mean of the responses by
career intention are discussed below (see Table 3). The entire table is in Appendix C.
"Careerists" had significantly higher satisfaction than others to the "Amt of Sea
Duty," "Quality of Family life," "Level of stress at work," "Amt of Family Separation,"
and "Enjoyment of Job." "Stayers" had significantly higher satisfaction with "Enjoyment
of Job" than the those who reported that they would laterally transfer or resign, though it
was significantly lower then the "Careerists." "Resigners" had significantly lower
satisfaction than others with "Quality of Family Life" and "Navy Leadership."
The results show that the single factor that best distinguishes the stay/leave
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decision is "Quality of Family Life." At one extreme, it separates out the "Resigners" from
the rest, and at the other extreme it separates the "Careerists" from the rest.
Unfortunately, "Quality of Family Life" is an ambiguous term and subject to varying
interpretations by the respondants. It would have been preferable to have a more specific
item in the survey, but that cannot be changed after the fact.
The only factor that best distinguishes "Stayers" from "Transfers" is "Enjoyment
of Job." Even though "Amount of Family Separation" had the lowest average satisfaction
response, it was only significant in distinguishing those who planned to remain in the Navy
as a Surface Warfare officer for twenty years from those who planned to remain in the
Navy as a Surface Warfare Officer for more than twenty years. It was not significant in
distinguishing those who lateral transfer or resign. It is also interesting to note that there
was no significant difference in the level of satisfaction with "Total Pay" among the
groups with different career intentions.
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0.000 3.093 2.620* 3.093 3.184 3.285
Quality of
family life
0.000 3.673 3.110* 3.523 3.632 3.987*
Level of stress
at work
0.000 3.456 2.950* 3.488 3.553 3.639
Number of
hours at work
0.000 3.591 3.020* 3.558 3.553 3.860
Amt of family
separation
0.000 3.908 3.540* 3.905 3.893 4.073
Navy
leadership
0.003 3.091 2.816 2.988 3.040 3.275*
Enjoyment
from job
0.000 2.930 2.101* 2.576* 3.211 3.348
* indicates means that are significantly different (p<05) from the other means
1= "Very satisfied," 2="Somewhat satisfied," 3- 'Neither satisfied or dissatisfied,"
4="Somewhat dissatisfied," 5="Very dissatisfied"
C. DD7FERNCES BETWEEN NUCLEAR-TRAINED AND CONVENTIONAL
SURFACE WARFARE OFFICERS
For several of the questions, there were significant differences in the responses of
conventional Surface Warfare Officers and nuclear-trained Surface Warfare officers. This
tends to indicate that, in general, nuclear-trained Surface Warfare Officers have a different
working environment and/or a systematically different perception of that environment
from Surface Warfare Officers who are not nuclear-trained. For example, Table 4 shows
that nuclear-trained Surface Warfare Officers work significantly more hours while in home
port than conventional Surface Warfare Officers.
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Table 4. "During your most recent sea tour, while in home port, how many hours per















418 1 9 28 34 21 7
Nuke
SWO
53 6 15 32 28 19
Combined 471 1 8 27 34 22 8
All percentages are rounded to the whole percent.
Table 5 shows that nuclear-trained Surface Warfare Officers perceive a lower-level
morale within their wardrooms.










Conv. SWO 419 13 33 26 20 10
Nuke SWO 52 4 19 35 31 12
Total 471 12 31 27 21 10
All percentages are rounded to the nearest whole percent.
Interestingly, nuclear-trained Surface Warfare Officers attributed the morale of
their ships to the Commanding Officer at a much lower rate than did conventional Surface
Warfare Officers. As shown in Table 6, the nuclear-trained officers gave more weight to
"The amount of time the ship was in home port," "The deployment schedule," and
"Other."
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Table 6. "What was the ONE most significant factor in your most recent ship's morale?"
n= %A %B %C %D %E %F %G
Conventional
SWO
416 48 16 7 6 8 5 10
Nuke SWO 49 18 22 6 6 18 6 22
Combined 465 45 17 7 6 9 6 11
All results are rounded to the nearest whole percent.
A= Command leadership
B= The amount of time the ship was in home port
C= Performance of the ship on exercises
D= Performance of the ship on inspections
E= Deployment schedule
F= Quality of liberty while on deployment
G= Other
D. THE NAVY' S INTERNAL LABOR MARKET FOR SWOS
To study the Navy's internal labor market for Surface Warfare Officers, the
respondents were asked the following two questions, the second immediately following
the first:
"If you could Lateral Transfer to the community of your choice, which ONE
would you pick?
I would not lateral transfer. I would keep my current designator.
Nuke SWO (only if you are currently a conventional SWO












"Which factors influenced your answer to the last question?
(Y=Yes, a significant factor; N=Not a significant factor)
Esprit de Corps Y N
Potential for promotion Y N
Total Pay Y N
Responsibility Y N
Quality of home life Y N
Professional development Y N
Time at sea Y N
Quality of leadership Y N
Stress at work Y N
Other (please specify):"
The purpose for these two questions was to identify what Surface Warfare Officers
thought was the best alternative in the Navy to their current community and why. By
cross-tabulating the selected alternative career path with the reasons for selecting that
alternative, insight can be gained into the differences in work factors among Navy
communities. This is a close substitute to what was done with the reservist survey. By
identifying the work factors associated with different Navy communities and how they
compare to Surface Warfare, a clearer picture can be obtained of the reasons for turnover
and lateral transfer by Surface Warfare Officers.
It is interesting to note that of those who desired to keep their current designator,
"Responsibility" was the one factor that was selected as a reason more often than those
who chose any other community. The single most popular alternative to Surface Warfare
was "Intelligence." Table 7 shows that the factors selected more often by those who
selected "Intelligence" than by those who selected Surface Warfare were: "Quality of
Life," "Professional Development," "Time at sea" and "Stress at Work "
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103 45 41 22 85 16 71 37 42 17
Nuke
SWO
2 100 50 50 50
Conv.
SWO
5 1 20 20 40 60 60 20 60
Aviation 36 71 9 48 39 53 50 33 32 73
Intell. 65 28 14 3 44 70 75 52 30 45
Subs 12 92 33 75 67 25 50 17 75 25
SEALs 27 86 11 11 70 11 52 15 70 37
EDO 34 26 24 62 88 79 53 39 38
EOD 17 95 12 6 65 48 71 59 59 12
Supply 18 56 39 6 50 67 72 56 61 72
JAG 45 20 16 14 33 82 69 58 27 44
Fleet
Support
44 30 14 2 18 91 32 80 20 63
Crypto. 26 27 12 35 66 62 35 42 50
Other 20 30 15 10 55 65 65 50 25 35
Total 454 43 22 15 53 55 64 47 38 41
All percentages are rounded to the nearest wole percent.
The three communities that received the highest percentage of responses to "Total
Pay" were, in descending order: "Nuke SWO (only if currently conventional SWO),"
"Submarines," and "Aviation." This result is expected since these are the three groups that
currently get paid more than conventional Surface Warfare Officers.
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E. A MODEL OF CAREER INTENTIONS FOR CONVENTIONAL
SURFACE WARFARE OFFICERS
A regression was run first on the respondents who indicated that they were not
nuclear-power-qualified. The responses to the satisfaction factors were investigated for
explanatory power of "career plan" (the dependent variable). The regression equation that
was developed did not have very much explanatory power for career decisions. This may
be due to the lack of demographic variables that often add explanatory power to career-
decision models. It should be noted that satisfaction with "Total Pay" and "Retirement
Benefits" were not significant in explaining career decisions for conventional Surface
Warfare Officers. The only sign that was unexpected was for the variable for the
satisfaction with "Command Opportunity." Satisfaction with "Command Opportunity"
was inversely correlated with intention to remain in the Navy. This result is counter-
intuitive but may be explained, nonetheless. Those who have the lowest satisfaction with
opportunity for command may be only those who plan on remaining in the Navy long
enough for that to be a personal concern. In other words, satisfaction with the opportunity
for command may not be driving career decisions; career decisions may instead be driving
the level of satisfaction with opportunity for command.
The regression equation, with all independent variables significant beyond the .05
level:
careerplan = 1.19 - 0.149 command + 0.268quallif + 0.216wrkhours + 0.106 leadrshp
command = satisfaction with "Command opportunity"
qualilif = satisfaction with "Quality of family life"
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wrkhours = satisfaction with "Number of hours at work"
leadrshp = satisfaction with "Navy leadership"
All independent variables are coded as follows:
l="Very satisfied" 2="Somewhat satisfied" 3="Neither satisfied or dissatisfied"
4="Somewhat dissatisfied" 5="Very dissatisfied"
The dependent variable, careerplan, was coded:
1= Careerists: intention to remain in Navy as a SWO for more than twenty
years.
2= Stayers: intention to remain in Navy as a SWO for twenty years.
3= Transfers: intention to lateral transfer to a different community.
4= Resigners: intention to resign before twenty years
Of 441 cases, 20 cases contained missing values, leaving 421 cases used.
Table 8. Regression of "careerplan" for conventional SWOs
Predictor Coefficient SS Standard
Dev.
T P
constant 1.194 n/a .2526 4.73 0.000
command -0.14863 0.024 0.06137 -2.42 0.016
qualilif 0.26771 64.60 0.05986 4.47 0.000
wrkhours 0.21563 20.67 0.05889 3.66 0.000
leadrshp 0.10590 4.77 0.05340 1.98 0.048
R-Sq=15.1% R-Sq(adj)=14.3% F= 18.57 P = 0.000
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F. A MODEL OF CAREER INTENTIONS FOR NUCLEAR-TRAINED
SURFACE WARFARE OFFICERS
A regression was also run on the respondents who indicated that they were nuclear
power qualified. The responses to the satisfaction factors were investigated, as before,
for explanatory power of "careerplan." Immediately it should be noted how much more
explanatory power (see Table 9) the model for the nuclear-trained SWOs has than the
model for the conventional SWOs. This is likely due in most part to fact that nuclear-
trained SWOs are a much more homogenous group than the conventional SWOs. The
heterogeneity of the conventional SWOs makes it more difficult to model the behavior of
the entire group. The satisfaction with "Command Opportunity" was the only significant
variable common between the conventional and nuclear-trained Surface Warfare Officer
models. As with the conventional SWO model, the nuclear-trained SWO model has a
negative sign for that variable. It is theorized that the negative sign may be explained by
the same reasons for both groups.
Table 9. Regression of "careerplan" for nuclear-trained SWOs
Predictor Coefficient SS Standard
Dev.
T P
Constant 3.0115 n/a .7780 3.87 0.000
command -0.6553 6.655 0.1868 -3.51 0.001
seaduty 0.5373 14.641 0.1441 3.73 0.001
retben 0.3599 3.818 0.1638 2.20 0.033
totpay -0.3397 4.246 0.1691 -2.01 0.050
R-Sq=37.2% R-Sq (adj) -31.9 F = 6.97 P = 0.000
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The satisfaction with "Total Pay," like "Command Opportunity," also had a
negative sign. The sign is theorized to be negative for the same reason for both variables.
Satisfaction with "Total Pay" does not drive the career decision in nuclear-trained SWOs.
Instead, the career decision is theorized to drive the satisfaction with "Total Pay." Those
nuclear-trained SWOs who have decided to stay in are more dissatisfied with their "Total
pay" than those who have decided to lateral transfer or resign because the level of pay will
actually affect the stayers in the future. Those nuclear-trained officers who have decided
to lateral transfer or resign do not care as much about pay because they are leaving and it
will not affect them.
The satisfaction with "Retirement Benefits," in contrast, is positively related to
staying in for nuclear-trained SWOs. This result may be due to the fact that satisfaction
with "Retirement Benefits" may be driving career decisions and not the other way around
as with "Command Opportunity" and "Total Pay."
It should also be noted that satisfaction with "Retirement Benefits" and "Total
Pay" were significant in explaining the career intentions of nuclear-trained SWOs but not
their conventional counterparts. A reason for this result may be that nuclear-trained
SWOs are systematically more influenced by considerations of current and future
compensation. This difference is expected because pay is why some nuclear SWOs may
have selected nuclear power training to begin with.
The regression equation, with all independent variables significant at the .05 level
is:
careerplan = 3.01 - 0.655 command + 0.537 seaduty + 0.360 retben - 0.340 totpay
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command^ satisfaction with "Command opportunity"
seaduty= satisfaction with "Amount of sea duty"
retben= satisfaction with "Retirement benefits"
totpay= satisfaction with "Total pay"
All independent variables are coded as follows:
1- 'Very satisfied" 2="Somewhat satisfied" 3="Neither satisfied or dissatisfied"
4="Somewhat dissatisfied" 5="Very dissatisfied"
The dependent variable, careerplan, was coded:
1= Careerists: career intention to remain in Navy as a SWO for more than twenty
years
2= Stayers: career intention to remain in Navy as a SWO for twenty years.
3= Transfers: career intention to lateral transfer to a different community.
4= Resigners: career intention to resign before twenty years
Of 54 cases used, 2 cases contained missing values, leaving 52 cases used.
63
64
VI. THE RESERVIST SURVEY RESULTS
A. DESCRIPTION OF THE RESPONDENTS
There are a total of 650 0-3 Surface Warfare Officers drilling in the Naval
Reserves. In all, 151 responses were obtained from the 500 queried 0-3 SWOs who are
currently drilling in the Naval Reserves. Tallied results are in Appendices D, E, and F.
Since the focus of this thesis is on voluntary turnover ofjunior Surface Warfare Officers,
the 1 8 respondents who indicated that they were involuntarily separated from active duty
were excluded from the analysis. Of the remaining respondents, 1 1 were nuclear-trained as
officers and two as prior-enlisteds. Three were female and 14 were non-white.
The selection criterion for the survey of current rank (0-3) within the Naval
Reserves, provides a distribution of time since leaving active duty and a distribution of the
number of years of commissioned service (Figures 1 and 2). Therefore, models ofwhen
the respondents left active duty and how their pay changes over time after they left active
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Figure 2. The Number of Years of Commissioned Service When Respondent Left Active
Duty. (n=133)
B. SATISFACTION WITH ACTIVE DUTY IN THE NAVY
The first set of questions requested that respondents "Indicate your satisfaction
with the following aspects of the Navy when you were on Active Duty:" The entire table
of tallied responses is in Appendix D. The most interesting findings are discussed below.
For comparison, in Table 1, the responses of the reservists are listed alongside the
responses of active-duty Surface Warfare Officers who were asked the same or similar
questions.
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Total Pay (R) 133 4 11 8 47 29
Total Pay (A) 495 5 16 14 54 12
Promotion
Opportunity (R)
133 3 20 19 45 14
Promotion
Opportunity (A)
495 4 11 21 48 15
Amount of Family
Separation (R)
132 40 35 23 2
Amount of Family
Separation (A)




133 49 35 9 7
Quality of family
life (A)
495 25 34 26 13 2
Number of hours
at work (R)
133 44 37 15 5
Number of hours
at work (A)
492 22 36 25 15 2
All percentages are rounded to the nearest whole percent.
C. COMPARISON OF THE ACTIVE-DUTY NAVY WITH CIVILIAN LIFE
The second survey question asked: "Compare your current satisfaction with
civilian life to your satisfaction with Navy life when you were on active duty:" The results
are shown below in Table 2.
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Table 2. The Factors that Respondents Indicated Were "Somewhat Better" or "Much
Better" as a Civilian.
Percentage Factor
96 Family separation
96 Time to spend with family and friends
84 Potential pay throughout career
80 Number of hours at work
72 Level stress at work
63 Your dependent's Medical/dental care




All percentages are rounded to the nearest whole percent.
The entire table of tallied responses is in Appendix E. Fifty-two percent of the
respondents stated that the level of responsibility at work was either "somewhat better" or
"much better" as a civilian than it was on active duty in the Navy. It is not surprising that
SWOs who leave active duty obtain jobs in the civilian sector that have lower levels of
responsibility than the they had when they were on active duty. What is remarkable is the
fact that 15 percent indicated that the level of responsibility was "somewhat better" or
"much better" in the civilian world. It is difficult to imagine how the responsibility of many
entry-level civilian jobs can compare with the responsibility of operating billion-dollar
weapons systems at sea with the lives of the crew and the security of the United States at
stake.
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There were four factors for which there was no consensus in the response: "your
medical/dental care," "retirement benefits," "leadership of direct supervisor," and "total
current pay." The conventional wisdom is that medical and dental care are superior in the
civilian sector to such care in the military. The fact that no consensus was reached on the
relative superiority of either tends to dispute that conventional wisdom. Of course, the
sample is comprised of mostly healthy young males for which little medical or dental care
may be necessary.
Conventional wisdom also holds that the retirement benefits for those who serve
in the military are quite generous compared to the civilian sector. The fact that this belief
was not reflected in the survey may call into question this assertion. Recent reductions in
military retirement benefits may make these respondents doubt whether the current
benefits would have remained intact until they reached military retirement.
Conventional wisdom holds that the military imparts superior leadership skills to
its members, particularly those who are in the officer corps. The fact that no consensus
was reached on the relative superiority of "leadership of your direct supervisor" between
the Navy and the civilian sector tends to dispute this belief. It is alarming that after all of
the time and money the Navy puts into leadership training of its officers, the end product
is merely at a level of parity with the civilian counterpart in the area of leadership.
It is interesting to note that there was no consensus on whether "total current pay'
was better on active duty or as a civilian. Forty-nine percent said "total current pay" was
either "slightly better" or "much better" as a civilian. It is even more interesting to note
that a higher percentage of SWO reservists (76 percent) were "somewhat satisfied" or
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"very satisfied" with "total current pay" in the active duty Navy than active duty SWOs
(66 percent) who were asked the same question (see Table 1). Both of these results tend
to confirm the hypothesis that junior Surface Warfare Officers are not resigning because of
low active-duty pay in the Navy.
D. POSTGRADUATE EDUCATION
The following questions concentrate on the subject of postgraduate-education
activities of those SWOs who left active duty. The results indicate that 60 percent of the
respondents have enrolled in some form of postgraduate education since leaving active
duty. Twenty-seven percent have completed a master's degree since leaving active duty.
Twenty-eight percent of the respondents have been studying in the area of business, and
19 percent have been studying in the field of engineering.
It is clear that there is a high interest in continuing education among those SWOs
who left active duty. Sixty-one percent of the respondents indicated that postgraduate-
education opportunities were "somewhat better" or "much better" in the civilian world
than in the active-duty Navy. These findings tend to indicate that if the Navy did a better
job of selling its postgraduate education opportunities to junior Surface Warfare Officers,
retention of this group might improve. It also indicates that any policy change that would
make postgraduate education less desirable for SWOs might have a negative impact on
retention.
If graduates of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) are ineligible for any SWO
retention bonus, a possibility under current consideration, it will have the effect of
increasing the personal cost of that education by the amount of the lost bonus. For
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instance, a SWO retention bonus of $10,000 a year for which NPS graduates would be
ineligible for four years would have the effect of raising the cost of an NPS education for
each officer by $40,000. Clearly, interest by Surface Warfare Officers in attending NPS
would plummet under this scenario.
E. COMPARISON OF NAVY AND CIVILIAN WORKING HOURS
The next set of questions asked the reservists to indicate the number of hours per
week they worked when in port on their most recent active-duty sea tour and in their
current civilian jobs. The results are shown in Table 3. For comparison, the working
hours reported in the active duty survey are also included. The reason for the difference
between the results for all the reservist respondents and results of only those who work
full-time is due to the fact that some of the respondents either work part-time jobs or are
unemployed. Though a precise calculation of the reduction in working hours per week
from active duty to the civilian sector is not possible with these data, it appears that the
reduction is significant. A majority of the reservists worked between 61 and 80 hours per
week when in home port on their last active-duty ship. A majority of the reservists who
have full-time jobs now work between 41 and 50 hours per week in their civilian jobs.
That constitutes a range of a 17 to 50 percent reduction in working hours per week.
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111 7 58 27 7 1
Reservists in port
when they were on
active duty
133 2 25 54 20
Conventional SWOs
in port now*
418 1 9 28 55 7
Nuke SWOs in port
now*
53 6 15 60 19
*from the active-duty survey described in chapter V.
Note: All percentages are rounded to the nearest whole percent
F. COMPARISON OF ACTIVE-DUTY PAY AND CIVILIAN PAY
Conventional wisdom suggests that junior Surface Warfare Officers leave active
duty to obtain a higher paying job in the civilian sector. The hypothesis of this thesis is
that junior Surface Warfare Officers do not leave active duty for higher paying civilian
employment. As discussed earlier, pay is not a significant factor in the turnover decision
ofjunior SWOs. More active duty SWOs are either "somewhat satisfied" or "very
satisfied" with "total pay" than with any other factor in the active-duty survey. More
reservists report they were "somewhat satisfied" or "very satisfied" with active duty
"Total Pay" than those who are currently on active duty.
While the satisfaction responses are convincing, the question about pay and
turnover cannot be completely settled until it is determined if SWOs who leave active duty
actually get higher or lower pay in their civilian jobs. As seen in Figure 3, the average
72
annual cut in pay right after junior SWOs leave active duty (who obtain full-time
employment) is nearly $8,500. The mean total Navy pay between years 1 and 9 (for those
who have full-time employment) when leaving active duty was $40,846. That translates
into a 21 percent pay cut. The regression in Figure 3 also indicates that civilian pay rapidly
rises, at an average increase of $3,486 per year. In a little over two years, pay has
returned to what it was when the member left active-duty, without taking inflation into
account. Taking inflation into account, it takes closer to three years to reach the previous
active-duty pay level.
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Figure 3. Change in Respondent Pay vs. Time Since Leaving Active Duty.
The initial civilian pay was higher than the Nakada, Mackin and Mackie ( 1 996)
estimate based on civilian earnings for a white male with a bachelor's degree and five
years of military experience. The data here suggest that initial pay after leaving active
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duty is on average $3 1,500, while the Nakada et al. study found it to be closer to $20,000.
The Nakada et al. model also estimates civilian salaries will rise about half as fast. If the
officers who are unemployed or are working part-time (due in some cases to obtaining
graduate education) are included, however, the average initial civilian salary is
approximately the same as the Nakada et al. estimate.
As the Figure 4 fitted-line regression shows, for those who were married before
they left active duty, the drop in pay is not nearly so severe. The pay cut may not be so
severe if the spouse's income can allow a longer job search after the SWO leaves active
duty. The spouse who may have been unemployed or employed part-time while on active
duty may take a full-time job after the SWO leaves active duty. This increase in
employment by the spouse mitigates the reduction in income for the household. Even so,
for married members, household income drops an average of $12,619 initially right after
leaving active duty. It then rises an average of $5,128 a year, without taking inflation into
account. Household income reaches pre-departure household pay in a little over two
years. If inflation were taken into account, it would take closer to three years to reach
pre-departure household income for married Surface Warfare Officers.
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Y = - 12.6185 + 5.12795X
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Years since leaving active duty
Figure 4. Combined Member and Spouse Pay over Time from Leaving Active Duty.
G. CHANGE IN SPOUSE'S INCOME AS A FUNCTION OF THE CHANGE
IN RESPONDENT'S INCOME
As shown in Figure 5 below, for those officers who were married before and after
leaving active duty, the change in pay for the SWO is inversely proportional to the change
in pay for the spouse. That is, the married SWOs that got the biggest pay cuts after
leaving active duty had spouses that tended to get the biggest pay increases after leaving
active duty. Conversely, the married SWOs that got the biggest pay increases after leaving
active duty had spouses that tended to get the biggest pay cuts after leaving active duty.
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Figure 5. Change in Spouse Pay vs. Change in Respondent Pay after Leaving Active Duty
H. HOW DOES CIVILIAN PAY COMPARE TO WHAT NAVY PAY WOULD
HAVE BEEN HAD THE RESPONDENT STAYED ON ACTIVE DUTY?
Since the Navy pay system is very complicated, a number of assumptions must be
made before an estimate can be calculated ofwhat reservists would have made had they
stayed on active duty. First, since the officer's income is being compared and not
household income, the officer is assumed to be single. This is actually the case in 41
percent of the respondents. It is also assumed that the officer leaves active duty at the end
of the Minimum Service Requirement (MSR) of 4 Years of Commissioned Service (YCS).
This is the most common case among the respondents to the reservist survey. Since pay
varies depending on duty station, the Basic Allowance for Quarters and the Variable
Housing Allowance are based on the Norfolk rates. More Surface Warfare Officers are
stationed in Norfolk than any other single base. It is also assumed that the respondent
would have been promoted to 0-4 at year 10 of service. Since additional pay is given for
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duty at sea, sea pay is included for a normal sea/shore rotation. (Sea duty is assumed for 2
to 4 YCS, and 8-11 YCS.) The details of the Navy pay calculation are in Appendix G. All
of the Navy pay information for this estimate was obtained from the Navy Times (1997)
pay charts. Clearly, if different assumptions are made, there will be different results.
The civilian pay estimate is based on the fitted-line regression of civilian
respondent pay after leaving active duty. The civilian pay has not been adjusted for past
inflation and the Navy pay line has not been adjusted for future inflation. If the past
inflationary rate of civilian pay is different from the future inflationary rate ofNavy pay,
then the results will be different. For the purposes of this comparison, the two inflation
rates are assumed to be equal.
The reason it takes longer to reach the departure active-duty Navy pay level than it
did in Figure 3 is that the Navy pay level used in this comparison is based on the current
Navy pay chart for the assumed officer living in Norfolk. In Figure 3, the fitted-line
regression was based on reported Navy salaries that may be lower depending on the
individual officer's circumstances. Also, if Figure 3 had been adjusted for inflation, it
would have the effect of making the time to reach pre-departure active-duty salaries
longer.
Eight years after leaving active duty, total civilian pay still does not equal what
Navy pay would have been if the respondent had stayed on active duty. From that point
on, civilian pay is projected to grow at a faster rate than Navy pay, though that is beyond
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Figure 6. Estimate of Civilian Pay and Navy Pay if the Respondent had Stayed on Active
Duty. (Navy Pay Data Obtained from Navy Times, 1997)
I. COMPARISON OF ESTIMATED POTENTIAL CIVILIAN HOUSEHOLD
INCOME TO ACTIVE-DUTY NAVY HOUSEHOLD INCOME
The next estimation is of potential active-duty Navy household income and
potential civilian household income. The same assumptions that were used for Navy pay
for Figure 6 are used in this case with the exception that in this comparison the "with
dependents" rates for Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) and Variable Housing
Allowance (VHA) were used. For the estimate of the spouse's income while the
respondent was still on active duty, a fitted-line regression of spouse income while the
respondent was on active duty was run against years of commissioned service (YCS).
None of the pay data were adjusted for inflation. Civilian pay is estimated from a fitted-
line regression of total household income after leaving active duty. (Details are in
Appendix G.)
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The results show that after leaving active duty, the average household income is
nearly $17,000 lower than the 4 year household income for a married SWO living in
civilian housing in Norfolk. Household income then rises more rapidly than Navy
household income. Projected civilian household income matches projected Navy
household income five and eight years after leaving active duty. The reason why
household income takes longer to reach pre-departure active-duty Navy household income
than it did in Figure 4 is the same reason that was given for Figure 6. Civilian household
income is projected to grow at a faster rate than Navy household income from that point





















Figure 7. Comparison between Estimates of Potential Active-Duty Navy and Civilian
Household Income. (Navy pay data obtained from Navy Times, 1997)
J. HEDONIC MODEL OF CHANGE EST PAY AFTER LEAVING ACTIVE
DUTY
From the literature review, hedonic wages are non-monetary work factors for
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which the worker accepts reductions in pay. With this concept in mind, a regression
model was developed from the reservist survey to determine if there were any non-
monetary job factors that SWOs who left active duty exchanged for salary. As indicted in
the model below, there were only three variables that were significant at the .05 level of
significance that explained salary differentials after leaving active duty: (l)Years since
leaving active duty (YRDIFF), (2) a binary variable that indicates if the member has full-
time employment (fulltime), and (3) the response to the question asking the respondent to
compare the level of work stress between his or her current civilian employment and the
level of stress experienced at work in the active-duty Navy (cwrkstress) were significant.
Table 4 describes the regression results.
Hedonic model of change in pay after leaving active duty:
Paydiff= -21.4 + 3.18 YRDIFF - 3.76 cworkstress + 29.3 fulltime
Definition of variables:
Paydiff = Current Civilian total pay - Total Navy pay when respondent left active
duty
YRDIFF = Years since respondent left active duty
fulltime = binary variable (l=currently employed full time, 0=unemployed or
employed part-time)
cworkstress = Response to question "Compare your current satisfaction with
civilian life to your satisfaction with Navy life when you were on active duty" for
the factor "Level of stress at work"
The coding for "cworkstress" is as follows:
1 = "Much better in the Navy," 2 = "Slightly better in the Navy," 3 = "About the
same as in the Navy," 4 = "Slightly better as a civilian," 5 = "Much better as a
civilian"
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Table 4. Regression of "Paydiff"
Predictor Coefficient SS Standard Dev. T P
constant -21.387 n/a 6.149 -3.48 0.001
Yrdiff 3.1751 9799.5 0.6520 4.87 0.000
fulltime 29.284 11372.9 3.440 8.51 0.000
cworkstress -3.763 1474.9 1.234 -3.05 0.003
R-Sq = 55.2% R-Sq(adj) = 54.0% F = 47.61 P = 0.000
There are several interesting conclusions that can be drawn from this model. The
first is that as the comparative level of stress at work improves as a civilian, the level of
pay decreases from what it was on active duty in the Navy. There is clearly a trade-off
being made between salary and work stress among junior SWOs who leave active-duty.
The second interesting conclusion that can be drawn concerns what was not
significant in predicting pay after leaving active duty. No other change in a work-related
factor was significant in explaining pay changes after leaving active duty. Also, years on
active duty did not significantly explain changes in pay from active-duty Navy to civilian
employment. In other words, the average pay drop was the same whether the respondent
left at the four-year point or the ten-year point. This insensitivity to years of service
indicates that additional years spent on active duty as an 0-3 result in very little value
added to the potential salary of the individual in the civilian job market. Having a master's
degree, obtained either on active duty or after leaving active duty, was not significant in
explaining the change in pay from active duty Navy to civilian pay. If these facts are
known to active-duty junior officers, it may be a factor in a majority of the turnover taking
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place as soon as the minimum service requirement expires.
K. THE EFFECT OF ACTIVE DUTY SERVICE ON CIVILIAN SALARIES
As seen in the regression of Figure 8 below, there is very little relationship between
years of commissioned service and the change in average civilian pay obtained by junior
Surface Warfare Officers who have full-time employment. SWOs who leave at the fourth
year of commissioned service have the same average change in pay when they leave active
duty (in dollars) as SWOs who leave at the tenth year of commissioned service. However,
since Navy pay is higher at the tenth year of service than it is at the fourth, the percentage
of the change is smaller at the tenth year.
Y = 45.0650 + 0.155089X



























2 345 8 7 88 10 11
Years of active duty commissioned service
Figure 8. Change in Pay after Leaving Active Duty vs. Years of Commissioned Service.
L. MODEL OF YEARS OF COMMISSIONED SERVICE WHEN
RESPONDENT LEFT ACTIVE DUTY
Since there is a range of years of active-duty service when the respondents left
active duty (Figure 2), there is an opportunity to develop a model that explains why
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respondents left the active-duty Navy when they did. The finding above that there is no
civilian salary benefit for staying on active duty until the tenth year suggests the question
why some of these reservists stayed on active duty as long as they did.
The following linear regression model was developed to explain why
commissioned-service respondents left active duty when they did. Table 5 describes the
regression results.
(All independent variables were significant at the .05 level.):
YCS = 1.89 + 0.178 commandpot + 0.463 spouseinf + 4.75nps + 2.47ta +2.68 pocket
+ 1.02 single + 0.251 seaduty
Definition of variables:
YCS = Years of commissioned service when the respondent left active duty
commandpot = Response to the question "What do you think your personal
chances would have been to get a command at sea if you had stayed on active
duty as a Surface Warfare Officer?"
Coding for commandpot: l="Very likely," 2 = "Somewhat likely," 3 = "Neither likely
nor unlikely," 4= Somewhat unlikely," 5 = "Very unlikely"
spouseinf= Response to the question "How much influence did your spouse have
on your decision to resign?"
Coding for spouseinf: 1 = "Not Applicable," 2 = "No influence," 3 = "Some
influence," 4= "Moderate influence," 5 = "A lot of influence."
nps = binary variable (1=1 obtained my master's degree from Naval Postgraduate
School, 0= I did not take any courses towards master's degree while on active
duty)
ta = binary variable (1=1 used tuition assistance for courses leading towards a
masters degree, 0= I did not take any courses towards master's degree while on
active duty)
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pocket = binary variable (1=1 took courses towards a master's degree while on active
duty without any monetary assistance from the Navy, 0= I did not take any
courses towards master's degree while on active duty)
single = binary variable (1=1 was not married at my last active-duty command, =
I was married at my last active-duty command)
seaduty = response to the question: "Indicate your satisfaction with the following aspects
of the Navy when you were on active duty" for the factor "Amount of sea duty."
Coding of seaduty: l="very dissatisfied," 2="somewhat dissatisfied," 3="neither
satisfied or dissatisfied," 4= "Somewhat satisfied," 5 = "very satisfied"
Table 5. Regression of Years of Commissioned Service (YCS)
Predictor Coefficient SS Standard Dev. T P
constant 1.8903 n/a 0.6672 2.83 0.005
Commandpot .1777 5.065 0.0887 2.00 0.047
Spouseinf .4630 10.446 0.1364 3.39 0.001
nps 4.747 21.063 0.3567 3.68 0.000
ta 2.4677 23.888 0.5890 4.19 0.000
pocket 2.6816 107.584 0.3567 7.52 0.000
single 1.0197 9.183 0.4265 2.39 0.018
seaduty 0.2508 6.203 0.1040 2.41 0.017
R-Sq = 49.4% R-Sq (adj) = 46.4% F = 16.3 1 P = 0.000
There are several conclusions that can be drawn from this model. The less likely
the respondent thought it would be to get command at sea, the longer he or she stayed in.
At first this does not make sense unless the assumption of cause and effect is reversed.
The better way to interpret this is to say that the longer the respondent stayed in before
leaving, the less likely the perceived potential for command. This indicates that those who
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leave early in their careers do so despite the fact that they feel they still have a high
likelihood for command. Those who leave later in their careers may be doing so because
they feel they have a low likelihood for command.
Having taken classes towards a master's degree by any means while on active duty
was significant in explaining when the respondent left active duty. Having taken the
classes resulted in staying on active duty longer. This may be due in large part to the fact
that junior Surface Warfare Officers do not have the opportunity to take classes until they
reach their first shore tour (that occurs after the minimum service requirement). By virtue
of the fact that they took any classes, they are not SWOs who left active duty as soon as
the minimum service requirement had expired. The coefficient for NPS was
understandably larger than for tuition assistance (TA) or out-of-pocket (pocket) because
of the three-to-four-year commitment to serve after graduating NPS. Even though use of
tuition assistance incurs a two-year commitment to serve after completing the classes, its
coefficient was smaller than the coefficient for "pocket" which incurs no commitment to
serve.
The coefficient for the variable "spouseinf ' indicated that the more influence the
spouse had on the decision to resign, the longer the respondent stayed in. A better
interpretation is to reverse the cause and effect. The longer the respondent stayed in, the
more of an influence the spouse had on the decision to resign. The coefficient for the
binary variable "single," when the factor of spousal influence is removed, indicates that
being single increases the number of years the respondent stayed in before leaving active
duty.
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The coefficient for the variable "seaduty" indicated that the more satisfied the
respondent was with the amount of sea duty, the longer the respondent stayed in before
leaving active duty. This result is perfectly reasonable.
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Vn. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. THE PRIMARY CAUSES OF JUNIOR SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER
TURNOVER
From the survey ofjunior Surface Warfare Officers on active duty, the factor that
most clearly distinguished those who plan to remain in the Navy for twenty years as a
SWO from those who plan to lateral transfer was greater "enjoyment ofjob." More
interestingly, the factor that most clearly distinguished from those who plan to resign and
those who plan to lateral transfer was significantly lower satisfaction with "Navy
leadership" and with "quality of family life." Those who planned to stay in the Navy as a
Surface Warfare Officer for more than 20 years were significantly more satisfied than the
others with "amount of sea duty," "quality of family life," "level of stress at work,"
"number of hours at work," "amount of family separation," and "enjoyment ofjob."
One conclusion that can be drawn from these results is that officers who plan to
stay in the Navy for more than 20 years have a significantly higher satisfaction with the
Navy in many areas. It is not so much a specific factor that causes these individuals to
have the intention to stay in the Navy for more than 20 yeras; rather it is more likely that
there is some characteristic in their personality or a "taste for military life" that causes
them to view most aspects of the Navy in a more positive light.
Those officers who plan to leave feel that the only way they can improve their
work and family environment is to leave the Navy completely. In their eyes, their
significantly lower satisfaction with "quality of family life" and "Navy leadership" can only
87
be improved in by leaving active duty. In comparison, those who plan to lateral transfer
did not have significantly different satisfaction with "quality of family life" and "Navy
leadership" from those who planned to stay in Surface Warfare. The officers who planned
to lateral transfer had significantly lower satisfaction than stayers in "job enjoyment." It
makes sense then, that the solution to their dissatisfaction would be to lateral transfer
rather than to resign.
From the fleet survey regression model of career plans for conventional SWOs,
satisfaction with "quality of family life," "working hours," "Navy leadership," and
"potential for command" were significant in explaining career decisions. From the fleet
survey regression model of career plans for nuclear-trained SWOs, satisfaction with
"potential for command," "amount of sea duty," "retirement benefits," and "total pay"
were significant in explaining career decisions.
The finding that nuclear-trained SWOs have a different model to explain their
career plans than conventional SWOs may be as important as the variables themselves.
The existence of a retention bonus for nuclear-trained SWOs may be acting to
systematically attract officers to the nuclear SWO community who consider pay a higher
priority in their career decision-making. Conventional SWOs may have been sorted by
the fact that they place a relatively lower priority on pay than nuclear-trained SW7Os in
their career decision-making. The result may be that the retention bonus given to nuclear-
trained SWOs may be less effective for conventional SWOs.
It is also interesting to note that a higher percentage of active-duty Surface
Warfare Officers was either "very satisfied" or "somewhat satisfied" with "total pay" than
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any other factor in the fleet survey. In addition, there was not a significant difference in
satisfaction with "total pay" between those who planned to stay on active duty and those
who planned to resign. The conclusion from these results is that pay is not an important
cause of the turnover for junior Surface Warfare Officers.
From the survey of 0-3 SWOs drilling in the Naval Reserves, the five factors that
improved the most since the respondents left active duty were (in order of decreasing
improvement): "family separation," "time to spend with family and friends," "potential pay
throughout career," "number of hours at work," and "level of stress at work." The one
area a majority of reservists reported was either "much better in the Navy" or "slightly
better in the Navy" was the "level of responsibility at work."
A comparison of pay when the reservist left active duty and the reservist's current
civilian pay produced some interesting findings. As hypothesized, fully-employed junior
SWOs, on average, initially take a significant pay cut (21 percent) when they leave active
duty. Single officers do not return to what their income would have been if they had
stayed on active duty, on average, even 8 years after leaving active duty. Married officers
who have full-time civilian employment, on average, take less of a household pay cut than
single officers, and household pay returns to its pre-turnover level between 2 and 3 years.
The loss of pay for married officers is mitigated somewhat by the increase in pay of their
spouses.
Analysis of the reservist survey found that years of commissioned service was not
significant in explaining post-turnover civilian pay. In other words, there was no civilian
pay advantage for leaving active duty as an 0-3 at ten years of commissioned service
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compared to leaving active duty sooner. Taking of master's degree courses while on
active duty also did not affect post-turnover civilian earnings for this group.
The three factors that were significant in explaining post-turnover civilian pay
were: years since leaving active duty, having full-time employment (compared to part-time
employment or being unemployed), and the relative change in the level of stress between
the civilian job and the active-duty Navy. The larger the improvement in relative stress
from the Navy to the civilian employment, the larger the average decrease in pay the
respondent obtained after leaving active duty. In other words, junior SWOs are giving up
income in exchange for lower levels of work-related stress. The minority of SWOs who
received pay increases after leaving the Navy were more likely to have the same or slightly
higher levels of stress at work in their new civilian jobs.
The factors that were significant in explaining when the SWO left active duty
were: "potential for command," "influence of spouse," having taken master's degree
courses while on active duty, and satisfaction with the "amount of sea duty." The later the
respondent left active duty, the less the respondent thought of his or her potential for
command and the more of an influence the spouse had in the decision. Having taken
master' s degree courses increased the time before leaving active duty, with courses at the
Naval Postgraduate School increasing the time on active duty more than courses taken by
other means. Not having been married on active duty increased the length of time before
the respondent left active duty.
Policies that would cause the spouse to see the Navy in a more favorable light
would have a greater positive retention effect for SWOs the more years of service the
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SWO has beyond the minimum service requirement. Since spouses have less influence on
turnover at the completion of the minimum service requirement, the effect on early
turnover would be smaller. Increasing the attractiveness of postgraduate education for
junior Surface Warfare Officers would also increase their retention.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Surface Warfare Officer Retention Bonus
There is no evidence to suggest that a retention bonus will not increase retention
ofjunior Surface Warfare Officers. Turnover ofjunior SWOs should be viewed as a
symptom of other problems. Though pay is not one of the problems, an increase in pay
may help alleviate the symptom of low retention while doing nothing to correct its
underlying causes.
The finding that conventional SWOs may value monetary incentives less than
nuclear-trained SWOs suggests that a bonus identical to the nuclear-retention bonus may
have less of a retention impact for conventional SWOs. If nuclear-trained SWOs are
ineligible for the SWO retention bonus, an unintended consequence will be that the pay
differential between conventional and nuclear-trained SWOs will be reduced. Since this
thesis indicates that nuclear-trained SWOs may be attracted by the relatively higher pay,
reducing that differential may make recruiting of officers for the nuclear SWO community
more difficult.
2. Non-monetary Methods to Improve Retention
While the Navy may not be able to do anything in the near future about the amount
of time ships are at sea, this thesis has uncovered some changes that could improve
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retention ofjunior Surface Warfare Officers. Thirty percent of all active-duty SWOs
surveyed in the fleet reported that they worked 7 1 hours or more per week when their
ship was in home port. Similar results were reported in the reservist survey. Under these
conditions, there is little distinction between a ship in port and a ship at sea for the officer
and his or her family. Reducing the working hours when ships are in home port may be
the single easiest and most effective change to improve the retention ofjunior Surface
Warfare Officers. If officers are taking lower-paying civilian jobs to lower their levels of
stress at work, then reducing the levels of stress for these officers may also improve
retention.
3. Postgraduate Education
Fifty-nine percent of the reservists surveyed have taken courses at a master's
degree level or higher since leaving active duty. Twenty-six percent have completed a
master's degree since leaving active duty. Twenty-nine percent of those who have taken
master's or higher-level courses took them in the field of business and sixteen percent
were in the field of engineering. Sixty percent of the respondents say that postgraduate
education opportunities were "slightly better" or "much better" as a civilian. Given these
results, it is clear that emphasizing postgraduate education opportunities in the Navy will
improve junior Surface Warfare Officer retention. Conversely, making recipients ofNavy
-
funded graduate education ineligible for any SWO retention bonus will have the effect of
making that education more expensive to the individual than it currently is. The result
may be a drop in interest among SWOs in Navy-funded postgraduate education and a
subsequent reduction in the effectiveness of the SWO retention bonus.
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4. Another Possible Solution to Meet Manning Needs
When asked, "If you had the opportunity to return to active duty, would you?" 6
percent of the 0-3 reservists said "yes" and 44 percent said "unsure." If retention goals
are not met with the SWO retention bonus, a plan to allow 0-3 SWOs who are drilling in
the Naval Reserves to return to active duty should be investigated. These officers have
been, in effect, on a no-cost shore tour. Twenty-seven percent have completed a master's
degree at no cost to the Navy since leaving active duty. Forty percent are currently single
and would therefore be more likely (and less expensive) to uproot and move to a new
location. If these officers are sent directly to Department Head School with a subsequent
two-year obligation to fill department head billets at sea, it would give the Navy a tool to
respond rapidly to shortages of SWOs for department head billets. Not only does the
Navy get the benefit of their civilian experience and education free of charge, but the
presence of a department head in the wardroom who found that the grass was not greener
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APPENDIX A. THE FLEET SURVEY
1) Indicate your satisfaction with the following aspects of the Navy:
Very Somewhat Neither satisfied Somewhat Very
satisfied satisfied or dissatisfied dissatisfied dissatisfied
Total Pay
Promotion opportunity
Amount of sea duty
Retirement benefits
Command opportunity
Quality of family life
Level of stress at work
Number of hours at work
The new fitrep system
Housing




2) What are your current career plans? I plan to:
[ ] Serve more than 20 years with my current designator
[ ] Serve 20 years with my current designator and then retire.
[ ] Lateral transfer to a different community.
[ ] Keep my current designator and resign before 20 years.
3) If you answered above that you were going to resign before 20 years, would the option
of transferring to the community ofyour choice change your mind?
[ ] Yes, I would stay in if I could transfer to the community ofmy choice.
[ ] No, I would still resign.
4) What capabilities do you think SC-21 should have? Given a fixed amount of money
which would you choose for the Navy?
[ ] A large number of SC-21's that would most closely resemble the FFG-7.
[ ] A moderate number of SC-21's that would most closely resemble the DD-963.
[ ] A smaller number of SC-21's that would most closely resemble CG-47.
[ ] A very few SC-21's that would be state of the art in every warfare area and have
V/STOL capability.
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5) If you could Lateral Transfer to the community ofyour choice, which ONE would you
pick?
I would not lateral transfer. I would keep my current designator.
Nuke SWO (only if you are currently a conventional SWO)











6) Which factors influenced your answer to the last question?
(Y=Yes, a significant factor, N=Not a significant factor)
Esprit de Corps Y N
Potential for promotion Y N
Total Pay Y N
Responsibility Y N
Quality of home life Y N
Professional development Y N
Time at sea Y N
Quality of leadership Y N
Stress at work Y N
Other (please specify):
7) On your most recent ship, if the ship had to reduce enlisted manning by 10%, which of
the following areas would be most adversely effected? (PICK THREE)
] Performing preventive maintenance
] Manning the GQ watch bill.
] Performing corrective maintenance
] Manning the condition III watch bill.
] Manning inport watch bills.
] Performing necessary cleaning and preservation.
] Performing special evolutions (unrep, flight quarters, sea and anchor, etc.)
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8) The following is a partial list of assignments available to SWOs during their Department
Head tours. Pick the THREE billets most likely to result in professional success and
viability on the "fast track."
] Combat Systems (DDG 51)
] Combat Systems (CG 47)
] Combat Systems (VLS Spruance)
] Combat Systems (FFG 7)
] LT/LCDR command
] Operations (DDG 51)
] Operations (FFG 7)
] Operations (VLS Spruance)
] Chief Engineer (DDG 51)
] ChiefEngineer(CG47)
] Chief Engineer (VLS Spruance)
] Chief Engineer (FFG 7)
9) How would you describe the impact ofTQL on your most recent ship (PICK ONE):
[ ] TQL was increasing its impact on my ship
[ ] TQL had a constant and continuous impact on my ship
[ ] TQL was declining in its impact on my ship
[ ] TQL never had an impact on my ship
10) On your most recent sea tour, while in home port, how many duty sections were YOU
in?
[ ] Two duty sections
[ ] Three duty sections
[ ] Four duty sections
[ ] Five duty sections
[ ] Six or more duty sections
1 1) On your most recent sea tour, while in home port, how many duty sections were a
majority of the CREW in?
[ ] Two duty sections
[ ] Three duty sections
[ ] Four duty sections
[ ] Five duty sections
] Six or more duty sections
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12) During your most recent sea tour, while in home port, how many hours per week did
you work?
[ ] less than 40 hours per week
[] 41 to 50 hours per week
[] 5 1 to 60 hours per week
[] 61 to 70 hours per week
[] 71 to 80 hours per week
[ ] more than 80 hours per week
13) If you could increase the pay of Surface Warfare Officers, which ONE option would
you choose? (Assume that the total cost to the Navy is the same for each alternative)
Start a "SWO pay" that would pay a monthly amount while on sea AND shore
duty and would begin on commissioning day.
[ ] Increase "Sea Pay," start paying it the first month of the first sea tour, and only pay
it while on a sea tour.
[ ] Pay an annual "SWO bonus" in return for a commitment to stay in the Navy for a
specified length of time.
[ ] I would not increase the pay of Surface Warfare Officers.
[ ] Other (please specify)
14) How would you describe the wardroom morale on your most recent ship's morale?
[ ] Very high
[ ] Somewhat high
[ ] Neither high or low
[ ] Somewhat low
[ ] Very low
15) What was the ONE most significant factor in your most recent ship's morale?
[ ] Command leadership
[ ] The amount of time the ship was in home port
[ ] Performance of the ship on exercises
[ ] Performance of the ship on inspections
[ ] Deployment schedule
[ ] The quality of liberty while on deployment
[ ] Other (Please Specify)
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16) The following is a partial list of shore tour options. Pick the THREE most career
enhancing billets for a Surface Warfare Officer's FIRST shore tour:
[ ] Washington DC. duty
[ ] Joint duty
[ ] Naval Postgraduate School
[ ] Shore Staff
[ ] Oversees duty
[ ] NROTC instructor
[ ] Naval War College
[ ] Naval Academy
[ ] SWOS instructor
17) What is your rank? [ ] ENS [ ] LTJG [ ] LT [ ] LCDR
1 8) How many months has it been since your were last assigned to a ship?
[ ] I am currently assigned to a ship.
[ ] I was last assigned to a ship months ago.
19) What class was your most recent (or current) ship?
20) Are you a nuclear trained officer?
[ ] Yes, I am a nuclear trained officer
[ ] No, I am not a nuclear trained officer
21) Are you a member of the Surface Navy Association?
[]Yes "
[]No
22) Are you a student at the Naval Postgraduate School?
[]Yes "
[]No
Thank you for taking the time to fill out this survey. The results will be printed in an
upcoming issue of the Surface Warrior. If you have any additional comments feel free to
write them on the back of this page. This survey will be read by fellow junior Surface
Warfare Officers and we welcome your input.
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Total Pay 495 12 54 14 16 5
Promotion
Opportunity
495 15 48 21 11 4
Amount of
sea duty
492 6 21 40 23 10
Retirement
benefits
491 10 37 29 15 9
Command
opportunity
490 8 33 42 13 4
Quality of Life 495 2 13 26 34 25
Level of stress
at work
491 1 19 31 29 19
Number of
hours at work
492 2 15 25 36 22
The new fitrep
system
495 11 36 32 15 7
Housing 493 11 24 48 11 6
Amt of family
separation
488 4 31 36 30
Navy leadership 491 4 32 25 29 10
Postgraduate
education
488 1 31 47 8 4
Enjoyment from
job
491 9 37 19 21 13
All percentages are rounded to the nearest whole percent.
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Total Pay 0.831 2.485 2.510 2.419 2.566 2.475
Promotion 0.899 2.400 2.440 2.453 2.368 2.377
Sea Duty 0.000 3.093 2.620* 3.093 3.184 3.285
Retirement
Benefits
0.542 2.758 2.768 2.616 2.763 2.823
Command
Opportunity
0.161 2.716 2.837 2.718 2.520 2.743
Qual. Life 0.000 3.673 3.110* 3.523 3.632 3.987*
Work Stress 0.000 3.456 2.950* 3.488 3.553 3.639
Work hours 0.000 3.591 3.020* 3.558 3.553 3.860
New Fitrep 0.489 2.715 2.740 2.837 2.592 2.686
Housing 0.207 2.769 2.818 2.942 2.684 2.698
Family Sep 0.000 3.908 3.540* 3.905 3.893 4.073
Leadership 0.003 3.091 2.816 2.988 3.040 3.275*
Postgrad
Education
0.757 2.619 2.643 2.547 2.573 2.658
Job
Enjoyment
0.00 2.930 2.101* 2.576* 3.211 3.348
* indicates means that are significantly different (at .95 level) from the other means
1= "Very satisfied", 2- 'Somewhat satisfied", 3="Neither satisfied or dissatisfied",
4="Somewhat dissatisfied", 5="Very dissatisfied"
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Total Pay 133 4 11 8 47 29
Promotion
Opportunity
133 3 20 19 45 14
Amount of sea duty 133 19 32 30 14 5
Retirement
Benefits
133 2 11 22 32 33
Time to spend with
family and friends
133 49 35 9 7
Level of stress at work 133 30 40 24 6
Number of hours at
work
133 43 37 15 5
Evaluation fairness 133 13 20 27 26 14
Housing 133 2 7 53 20 18
Family separation 132 40 34 23 2
Leadership of the CO
ofyour last ship




133 23 25 10 24 18
Your Medical/Dental
care
133 3 9 19 38 30
Your Dependant's
Medical/Dental care
72 5 13 26 33 23
Postgraduate education
Opportunities
133 10 20 29 31 11
Enjoyment fronTjob 133 8 21 18 43 10
Responsibility at work 133 1 4 8 44 44
All percentages are rounded to the nearest whole percent
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131 15 17 24 26 18
Your dependant's
Medical/Dental care
65 9 12 16 35 28
Housing 133 5 8 38 20 29
Retirement benefits 133 24 19 17 20 21
Total current pay 132 14 20 17 25 24
Potential
pay throughout career
133 4 5 8 16 67
Post-graduate
education opportunities
132 5 14 20 26 36
Leadership of direct
supervisor
132 12 17 27 20 25
Level of stress at work 132 8 22 32 40
Number of hours at
work
132 2 2 16 27 53
Tune to spend with
family and friends
132 2 2 17 80
Level of responsibility
at work
132 14 38 32 8 8
Enjoyment from job 132 3 8 32 30 28
Family separation 129 2 1 2 10 86
Advancement
Opportunities
132 3 21 17 28 31
All percentages are rounded to the nearest whole percent.
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APPENDIX F. TALLIED RESULTS OF RESERVIST SURVEY
At your last permanent duty station, what type of housing did you live in?
(n=132)
91% A) Civilian housing
6% B) Base housing
0% C)BOQ
2% D) Lived on board ship
1% E) Other
If you had been given the opportunity to lateral transfer to the community of your choice,





If the Navy had offered you an annual bonus, what is the least amount that would have
persuaded you to remain on active duty as a Surface Warfare Officer?
(n=132)
12% A) No bonus would have been necessary to keep me on active duty
8% B) $8,000 per year
26% C) $12,000 per year
17%o D) $16,000 per year
38% E) No bonus would have convinced me to stay on active duty.
If you could have lateral transferred to one of the following communities, which would
you have picked?
(n=132)
19% A) JAG Corps
4% B) Fleet Support ( 1 700)
15%) C) Engineering Duty Officer
23%o D) Intelligence
39%. E) None of the above
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14% B) Explosive Ordnance Disposal
1 1% C) Supply Corps
8% D) Medical Corps, Dental Corps, or Nurse Corps
54% E) None of the above
Was Surface Warfare your first choice of designator when you joined the Navy?
(n=132)
55%o A) Yes, it was my first choice
6% B) No, my first choice was submarines
7% C) No, my first choice was NFO
21% D) No, my first choice was pilot
1 1% E) No, my first choice was a designator not listed above
What do you think your personal chances would have been to get a command at sea if you
had stayed on active duty as a Surface Warfare Officer?
(n=133)
38% A) Very likely
31% B) Somewhat likely
9% C) Neither likely nor unlikely
13%) D) Somewhat unlikely
10% E) Very unlikely
How much influence did your spouse have on your decision to resign?
(n=132)
57% A) Not Applicable
4% B) No influence
14% C) Some influence
13% D) Moderate influence
13% E) A lot of influence
114
How accurate was your letter of resignation in stating your reasons for resigning?
(n=132)
18% A) Not applicable
37% B) Very accurate
36% C) Somewhat accurate
4% D) Very inaccurate
5% E) Extremely inaccurate
Do you currently have a Master';> degree?
(n=133)
65% A) No, I have not completed a master's degree.
8% B) Yes, I competed a master's degree before I left active duty.
27% C) Yes, I have completed a master's degree after I left active duty"
If you have ever taken courses towrads a master's degree while on active duty, how were
they funded?
(n=129)
83% A) I did not take any courses towards a master's degree while on active duty.
1% B) I obtained my master's degree at the Naval Postgraduate School.
5% C) I used tuition assistance for courses leading toward a master's degree.
12% D) I took courses towards a master's degree while on active duty without amy
monteary assistance from the Navy.
Since I left active duty:
(n=128)
40% A) I have not enrolled in a master's or PhD program.
27% B) I have been a part-time student in a master's degree program.
2% C) I have been a part-time student in a PhD program.
26% D) I have been a full-time student in a master's program.
6% E) I have been a full-time student in a PhD program."
If you have worked on a master's degree or PhD, in what subject area was it?
(n=131)






Ifyou have worked on a master's degree or PhD, in what subject area was it?
(n=126)





What is your current employment status?
(n=133)
84% A) I am employed full-time.
3% B) I am employed part-time and looking for full-time employment.
6% C) I am employed part-time and looking for full-time employment.
2% D) I am not employed and am looking for work.
5% E) I am not employed and I am not looking for work.






30% E) None of the above






37% E) Never married
Is your spouse currently: (n=133)
41% A) N/A, I am currently not married
2% B) On active duty in the military
32% C) Working full-time in a civilian job
1 1% D) Working part-time in a civilian job
14% E) A homemaker
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When I was at my last active duty command, my spouse was:
(n=132)
60% A) N/A, I was not married at my last active duty command.
2% B) On active duty in the military
21% C) Working full-time in a civilian job
5% D) Working part-time in a civilian job
11% E) A homemaker






0% E) More than three






0% E) More than three




15%o C) Combat Systems
6% D) Deck Department (Only ifDeck was a department on your last ship)
4% E) Other
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On average, how many hours per week do you spend taking and preparing for classes?
(n=130)
76% A) 0-10 hours
11% B) 10-20 hours
2% C) 20 -30 hours
3% D) 30 - 40 hours
8% E) more than 40 hours
Did you complete Nuclear Power School and prototype?
(n=133)
90% A) No.
8% B) Yes, as an officer
2% C) Yes, as an enlisted only.






0% E) None of the above
Through which of the following commissioning programs did you obtain your
commission?
(n=133)
23% A) OCS or AOCS
53% B) NROTC Scholarship
1 1% C) NROTC non-Scholarship
12% D) Naval Academy
2% E) Other
Do you have any prior enlisted service9
(n=133)
86% A) No.
8% B) Yes, less than four years.
6% C) Yes, more than four years.
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4% C) Asian/Pacific Islander
0% D) American Indian
2% E) Other

















































4 3015 150 154 541 643 184 218 48531 50163
5 3015 o*** 154 541 643 184 219 46832 48363
6 3159 o#** 154 541 643 184 219 48463 50095
7 3159 Q*** 154 541 643 184 219 48463 50095
8 3272 150 154 541 643 184 219 51621 53252
9 3272 160 154 541 643 184 219 51751 53371
10* 3620 200 154 675 777 209 240 58299 59892
11 3620 205 154 675 777 209 240 58359 59952
12 3823 o*** 154 675 777 209 240 58339 59933
Note: All dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar for presentation.
All pay figures ontained from Navy Times ( 1 997)
* Promotion to LCDR assumed
**Years of Commissioned Service
*** Shore duty assumed
Fitted line regression model of respondent pay after leaving active duty (used in Figure 6):
SRespondent civilian annual salary = $39100 + $1870*(years since leaving active
duty)
R-Sq = 0.056 R-Sq (adj) = 0.047 F=6.41 P= 0.013
Fitted-line regression model of spouse pay while respondent is on active duty (used in
Figure 7):
SSpouse income = $7162 + $1430*(YCS)
R-Sq=0.033 R-Sq(adj)=0.015 F= 1.82 P= 0.183
Fitted line regression model of civilian household income after leaving active duty (used in
Figure 7):
$Total civilian household income = $50500 + 4280*(years since leaving active
duty)
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